## Hearing Transcript

## 2017 Automobile Insurance Review

## September 6, 2018

## PRESENT:

The Board:
Darlene Whalen, Chair and CEO
Dwanda Newman, Vice-Chair
James Oxford, Commissioner

Parties (Alphabetical Order)
Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association Ernest Gittens

## Campaign to Protect Accident Victims

Colin Feltham
Jerome Kennedy
Consumer Advocate
Dennis Brown, Q.C.
Andrew Wadden
Insurance Bureau of Canada ( IBC)
Amanda Dean
Kevin Stamp
Trevor Foster
Spinal Cord Injury NL
Thomas Fraize
Lara Fraize-Burry
Michael Burry

## Board Counsel/ Staff:

Jacqueline Glynn, Board Counsel
Ryan Oake, Regulatory Analyst
Peter O'Flaherty, Q.C., Hearing Counsel

## Presenters:

Paula Elliott, Oliver Wyman


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MR. FELTHAM: | 1 | - so in that case, we don't assume 10 |
| 2 | Q. You were provided with the information, so | 2 | percent. We're trying to measure what it |
| 3 | you were aware that it existed, but you | 3 | was. In Part II, we say what would the |
| 4 | weren't involved in discussions with GISA | 4 | required premiums be if you targeted a 10 |
| 5 | for the production of the letter, or that | 5 | percent return in our Part II, and compare |
| 6 | sort of thing? | 6 | that to what the actual premium earned was, |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | and then Part C is trying to - Part III, |
| 8 | A. No. | 8 | rather, is trying to forecast what 2017 |
| 9 | MR. FELTHAM: | 9 | would be. So in Part I, we're trying to |
| 10 | Q. No? | 10 | measure the profit as opposed to saying it |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | was 10 , and what would the premiums be if |
| 12 | A. No, not - no, no. | 12 | you targeted 10 percent. So there's no need |
| 13 | MR. FELTHAM: | 13 | to state it here. |
| 14 | Q. Okay, if we could go back to the report | 14 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 15 | document, please, and page 5. Thank you. | 15 | Q. Okay, and if we look at page 2, and I'm |
| 16 | So this is under the Methodology and | 16 | getting at the Part B that you're referring |
| 17 | Discussion section of your report, and it's | 17 | to in your answer - |
| 18 | here that you note your key assumptions, | 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 19 | correct? | 19 | A. Uh-hm. |
| 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | (9:15 a.m.) |
| 21 | A. It's in reference to the information that's | 21 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 22 | used to derive the calculations, yes. | 22 | Q. At the bottom underneath Table 1, "We note |
| 23 | MR. FELTHAM: | 23 | that the Board of Commissioners, Public |
| 24 | Q. Right, and these A, B, and C items under | 24 | Utilities Board, guideline target profit |
| 25 | Methodology and Discussions, these are | 25 | level for private passenger automobile rate |
|  | Page 6 |  | Page 8 |
| 1 | assumptions made by you in the preparation | 1 | filings is an ROE of 10 percent". So that's |
| 2 | of this report? | 2 | what you're assessing your findings against, |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | if you will, that's the benchmark that |
| 4 | A. It's simply referencing that we're going to | 4 | you're assessing results against as to what |
| 5 | look at loss amounts, expense amounts, and | 5 | should be achieved? |
| 6 | profit, yeah. | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 | A. Yes, so when rates are filed with the Board, |
| 8 | Q. Okay, so were not key assumptions here in | 8 | the companies target 10 percent in their |
| 9 | this process relating to the claim costs you | 9 | pricing model to determine what rate is |
| 10 | indicated in A , the operating cost reported | 10 | indicated, and then now we're looking back |
| 11 | by the insurers in B , and the return on | 11 | in time and trying to estimate what was the |
| 12 | investment in C ? | 12 | ROE after-tax achieved, and then saying, |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 | well, 10 percent was the target upon which |
| 14 | A. Yes, that's what we considered, yes. | 14 | rates were set, but sometimes your losses |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 | are higher or lower than what are expected, |
| 16 | Q. Okay, and we don't see here in this | 16 | and so your profit, of course, will be |
| 17 | particular section anything related to the | 17 | higher or lower accordingly. So this is a |
| 18 | return on equity, but this was also an | 18 | look back in time to see what the returns |
| 19 | assumed factor on your part, was it not, | 19 | were. |
| 20 | that the appropriate return on equity was 10 | 20 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 21 | percent? | 21 | Q. Right, and in determining whether you have |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | rate adequacy or insufficiency, we are |
| 23 | A. No, I - let me explain. In our report, we | 23 | measuring results against that 10 percent |
| 24 | present three parts. Part I is a hindsight | 24 | benchmark? |
| 25 | measurement of what the return was. Part II | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |


|  | Page 9 |  | Page 11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | A. Not in this table, but in Part II, yes. | 1 | provision, a comparable provision, and |
| 2 | MR. FELTHAM: | 2 | Ontario is 5 percent. So it would be in the |
| 3 | Q. No, no, I'm sorry, it's not in the table. | 3 | range of what other provinces are using. |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 5 | A. Yes, yeah. | 5 | Q. My understanding, though, is that's - |
| 6 | MR. FELTHAM: | 6 | comparing to other provinces is not the |
| 7 | Q. Just in the overall approach to the report | 7 | manner in which an appropriate ROE should be |
| 8 | and your analysis, that's what you're doing? | 8 | set, you know, if we were engaged in that |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | process? |
| 10 | A. Yes, companies target a return when they set | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | their rates, and then you can look back in | 11 | A. I'm not stating that that's how you should |
| 12 | time and say, well, gee, did I achieve that | 12 | determine it. What I'm stating is that in |
| 13 | or not, and that's what we're doing here. | 13 | using that number, it was in the range of |
| 14 | MR. FELTHAM: | 14 | what is used and a reasonable number to use. |
| 15 | Q. Right, and in this case, did we achieve an | 15 | I'm not saying that it's the right number |
| 16 | ROE of 10 percent or not? | 16 | nor the wrong number. I'm just stating that |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | it is in the range of what is used in other |
| 18 | A. Right. | 18 | provinces. So in my use of that number, it |
| 19 | MR. FELTHAM: | 19 | would not be unreasonable. |
| 20 | Q. And that 10 percent figure, that comes, as I | 20 | FELTHAM: |
| 21 | understand it, from the Board's benchmark | 21 | Q. And no one asked you to examine whether the |
| 22 | hearing ruling in, I think, 2005? | 22 | ROE should be 10 percent or not, or a |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | benchmark? |
| 24 | A. Economists would have determined that | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | number. | 25 | A. That's correct. |
|  | Page 10 |  | Page 12 |
| 1 | MR. FELTHAM: | 1 | R. FELTHAM: |
| 2 | Q. Right, and you haven't done any | 2 | Q. Okay, but that determination should be made |
| 3 | determination - made any determination, | 3 | based on evidence and a hearing process? |
| 4 | engage in anything to determine whether or | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | not 10 percent is a reasonable return on | 5 | A. By an economist. |
| 6 | equity? | 6 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | Q. Yes, by an economist. |
| 8 | A. I'm not an economist. That's not what I do, | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | no. | 9 | A. Yeah. |
| 10 | MR. FELTHAM: | 10 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 11 | Q. And you're not a cost of capital expert? | 11 | Q. So if the target ROE, which is what I'll |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 | call that, 10 percent, if it was not |
| 13 | A. Not that either, no. | 13 | assumed, then it should have been different |
| 14 | MR. FELTHAM: | 14 | each year based on what evidence would tell |
| 15 | Q. So you have any idea how the cost of equity | 15 | us. Then that would make your premium |
| 16 | capital today compares to what it would have | 16 | adequacy estimates misleading, would it not? |
| 17 | been in 2005? | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | A. Well, it certainly would not make what we've |
| 19 | A. Well, the cost of capital and return on | 19 | presented here in the table that is on the |
| 20 | equity are often used interchangeably. A 10 | 20 | screen misleading because that's measuring |
| 21 | percent guideline that the Board has equates | 21 | what it was in hindsight, and furthermore, |
| 22 | to approximately, with the current tax rate, | 22 | looking at Part II where we measure what was |
| 23 | an investment rate assumption of 5.74 | 23 | the actual earned premium and what was the |
| 24 | percent of premium as a loading provision in | 24 | required premium based on that 10 percent, |
| 25 | the rates. Alberta has a 7 percent | 25 | it does not make that unreasonable or |

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| 1 | A. | Based on a target of 10 percent, yes. | 1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | MR. FELTHAM: | 2 |  |
| 3 | Q. | Yes, okay. Let's go back just one page to | 3 |
| 4 |  | page 1, please. So the second paragraph | 4 |
| 5 |  | here you note that, 'Insurance industry | 5 |
| 6 |  | profit levels can be estimated and measured | 6 |
| 7 |  | in several ways". I guess, my question for | 7 |
| 8 |  | you on that is how many ways are there and | 8 |
| 9 | what are they? | 9 |  |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 |  |
| 11 | A. | Well, the two key ways are percent of | 11 |
| 12 |  | premium referred to as POP, and return on | 12 |
| 13 | equity, and then you can look at that pre- | 13 |  |
| 14 | tax, after-tax. So that's our reference. | 14 |  |
| 15 | That's the two common ways, and as an | 15 |  |
| 16 | investor, you'd want to look at what's the | 16 |  |
| 17 | return on equity if you're investing in a | 17 |  |
| 18 |  | company, so that's a very typical way. Then | 18 |
| 19 | the percent of premium is sort of a | 19 |  |
| 20 | simplified way to look at it because | 20 |  |
| 21 | consumers can understand if the percentage | 21 |  |
| 22 | of premium - a profit as a percentage of | 22 |  |
| 23 | premium is allowed is 5.74 percent, and they | 23 |  |
| 24 | would know for every \$100.00 of premium, | 24 |  |
| 25 | there's \$5.74 allowed for profit. So that's | 25 |  |

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, sure, any number, if you substitute a different assumption and wish it was something else, of course, it would change, but we're not dealing with wishes and I wish it was something different. I was measuring what it was.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Based on that assumed 10 percent as the benchmark?
MS. ELLIOTT:
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Yes, okay. Let's go back just one page to
page 1, please. So the second paragraph
here you note that, "Insurance industry
profit levels can be estimated and measured
in several ways". I guess, my question for
you on that is how many ways are there and
what are they?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, the two key ways are percent of
premium referred to as POP, and return on
equity, and then you can look at that pre-
tax, after-tax. So that's our reference.
That's the two common ways, and as an
investor, you'd want to look at what's the
return on equity if you're investing in a
company, so that's a very typical way. Then
the percent of premium is sort of a
simplified way to look at it because
consumers can understand if the percentage
of premium - a profit as a percentage of
premium is allowed is 5.74 percent, and they
would know for every $\$ 100.00$ of premium,
there's $\$ 5.74$ allowed for profit. So that's

## 1 MR. FELTHAM:

Q. But you haven't examined whether the

Page 17
Page 19
expenses themselves -
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Again I'm not an auditor. I do not audit data.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. You've just accepted what's being provided and you work with those?
MS. ELLIOTT:
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And if the expenses were determined to be overstated, that would affect your findings on profit levels?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Understated, overstated, either way, yeah.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Yes. I had some questions for you as well in relation to the written answers to interrogatories, and that's where I'd like to go next if I could. This would be the Oliver Wyman letter of July 6th, 2018, Responses to Interrogatories. Okay. So, I have the document and I'm interested in

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Page 18
Page 18going to page 6. So, this is - page 6 is inthe area that contains your response toquestions from the Insurance Bureau of
Canada. It actually starts on page 5
though. And Answer 3 on page 6. So, this -
well, I'll repeat the question, just so we
have some context.
"Ms. Elliott, an intervener has
requested that you estimate industry return
on equity (ROE) ratio to expense percentages
in Newfoundland and Labrador. These
percentages include 18.2, 20.2 and 24.4.
Could you please comment on why you used the
General Insurance Statistical Agency's
published expense ratios and the
reasonableness of your selection relative to
these three requested percentages above?"
So, I gather what IBC is asking there
is in relation to the question that CAPLA
APTLA had asked, where they asked you to
substitute some expense ratios and redo some
calculations, okay.
So, your response here below indicates
"the suggested expense provisions" which are
the 18.2 percent and so on, "are not based

|  | Page 21 | Page 23 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | assess and recommend possible options to | 1 | A. | Well, with respect, I would have to go to |
| 2 | contain costs." So, as a starting point, I | 2 |  | Intact or Aviva and find out, you know, what |
| 3 | would suggest to you that's fairly broad. | 3 |  | their operation is and spend months and |
| 4 | And then if we go to the very bottom, the | 4 |  | months reviewing their operation, as to how |
| 5 | last point under II, it indicates "to report | 5 |  | to lower perhaps their general expense ratio |
| 6 | any other cost savings or other improvements | 6 |  | from 10 to 9.5 and you know, there are |
| 7 | on any aspect of automobile insurance | 7 |  | numerous companies in the province and that |
| 8 | offered in this province". So, you know, | 8 |  | wasn't the exercise that I certainly |
| 9 | again, that's a big broad catchall, I would | 9 |  | understood or was directed to undertake, to |
| 10 | suggest, in terms of anything that can be | 10 |  | go to advise all the large companies how to |
| 11 | done to reduce costs. | 11 |  | reduce their costs. |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 13 | A. It would be very broad. It could be | 13 | Q. | Okay. No, fair enough. And instead, we |
| 14 | improving, you know, roads to make them | 14 |  | accept what's provided by the insurers as |
| 15 | safer. I mean, there are many aspects of | 15 |  | expenses in various - |
| 16 | that. Our report was not that broad. | 16 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 17 | MR. FELTHAM: | 17 | A. | Knowing they're in very similar range in |
| 18 | Q. And in your view, there was no need to go | 18 |  | other provinces, yes. |
| 19 | into the expense provision and determine | 19 |  | FELTHAM: |
| 20 | whether any changes could be made or ought | 20 | Q. | Be that as it may, we're still relying on |
| 21 | to be made in that regard? Obviously | 21 |  | what they provide to you as the expense |
| 22 | changes there would mean changes in cost. | 22 |  | figures? |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 24 | A. In terms of the expenses, again repeating | 24 | A. | Yes. I can't make up a number, so I have to |
| 25 | myself, we were looking at the hindsight, | 25 |  | use what's given to me by the people that |
|  | Page 22 |  |  | Page 24 |
| 1 | what they were in the measurements that we | 1 |  | collect the data. |
| 2 | did, not what if they were a certain number. | 2 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 3 | In looking forward to expenses, I'm | 3 | Q. | Okay. So, switch gears a little bit here. |
| 4 | certainly in favour of anything that makes | 4 |  | When you - in making your calculations in |
| 5 | the expense provision in rates lower, so | 5 |  | your report of auto insurance company profit |
| 6 | that that reduction in expense cost | 6 |  | in Newfoundland and Labrador, you didn't |
| 7 | translates to lower premiums for consumers. | 7 |  | exclude any companies from your analysis? |
| 8 | It's a very positive thing. | 8 |  | You would have included data from all the |
| 9 | There are three main parts to expenses: | 9 |  | companies who are underwriting auto policies |
| 10 | the commissions that are paid to brokers; | 10 |  | here? Is that correct? |
| 11 | the contingent commission that is paid to | 11 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 12 | brokers, that component of commissions; the | 12 | A. | That's correct, yes. |
| 13 | premium tax rate that's five percent; and | 13 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 14 | then the general operating expenses, the | 14 | Q. | And did you consider whether it might be |
| 15 | rent, the salaries. To conduct such a | 15 |  | reasonable to exclude some of the companies |
| 16 | study, and we're dealing with numerous | 16 |  | for any reason? |
| 17 | companies, so to drive out lower rates, | 17 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 18 | lower costs, that's a different review and | 18 | A. | Well, I think, you know, you can go in and |
| 19 | that was not something that we undertook or | 19 |  | make exclusions and say gee, if we excluded |
| 20 | stated that we would undertake. | 20 |  | all the companies that made high profits, |
| 21 | MR. FELTHAM: | 21 |  | then we'd have a different number and if we |
| 22 | Q. Well, I mean, I follow what you're telling | 22 |  | excluded all the people that had low |
| 23 | me, but you know, with respect, I'm not sure | 23 |  | profits, then we'd have a different number, |
| 24 | it's a different review. | 24 |  | and perhaps that would be informative, but |
| 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 25 |  | we chose not to make any decision to exclude |


| 1 | people or companies rather because we were | 1 |  | them in the analysis with this sort of |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | trying to frame the answer in a different | 2 |  | aggregate approach that you've taken, |
| 3 | way or manner. I think we were - not I | 3 |  | doesn't the auto insurance consumer kind of |
| 4 | think, I know we were presenting an estimate | 4 |  | wind up subsidizing the business operation |
| 5 | for the industry, including all insurers, be | 5 |  | of that company? |
| 6 | that what it may, you know, make money, lose | 6 | A. | Nobody's subsidizing anything. We're |
| 7 | money, and not trying to exclude anybody to | 7 |  | looking back at what the results were. They |
| 8 | frame a different answer, just provide the | 8 |  | are what they are. If you want to exclude |
| 9 | facts as they are. | 9 |  | somebody then you're just saying well, these |
| 10 | MR. FELTHAM: | 10 |  | are the results if I exclude the guys that |
| 11 | Q. So, the answer is no, you didn't think it | 11 |  | have a low profit level. That's all you |
| 12 | was reasonable to exclude any companies? | 12 |  | know now. We're just measuring it. Moving |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 |  | forward and how that will benefit consumers |
| 14 | A. I see no reason to exclude any companies if | 14 |  | in the future with whatever the Government |
| 15 | we're trying to measure what the results | 15 |  | decides to do here, that's how you're going |
| 16 | were in the past. | 16 |  | to benefit consumers. Looking back and |
| 17 | . FELTHAM: | 17 |  | making artificial measurements of the past |
| 18 | Q. But more than trying to measure what results | 18 |  | results because you exclude the low people, |
| 19 | were in the past, we're also trying to | 19 |  | the low insurers, I'm not sure what that |
| 20 | determine what's appropriate for the future | 20 |  | achieves. You can do it, but you're just |
| 21 | as part of this, are we not? | 21 |  | giving hypothetical results of what the |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 |  | profits would have been if we exclude the |
| 23 | A. I don't think measuring what the results | 23 |  | low ROE insurers. |
| 24 | were for the past of the profits, loss | 24 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 25 | experience, all the different reasons that | 25 | Q. | Let's take a bank for example. Some of |
|  | Page 26 |  |  | Page 28 |
| 1 | drive the results, excluding anything | 1 |  | them, most of them, are in the insurance |
| 2 | doesn't assist you in any manner. | 2 |  | business, auto insurance business in |
| 3 | R. FELTHAM: | 3 |  | particular, and I guess other types of |
| 4 | Q. What if a company or companies had negative | 4 |  | insurance, but we're talking about auto. |
| 5 | ROEs, perhaps even significantly negative | 5 |  | The business model of the bank - |
| 6 | ROEs, for the entire past period? That | 6 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 7 | doesn't change your view? | 7 | A. | I'm sorry, which bank are you referring to |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 |  | here in the Province? |
| 9 | A. It is what it is. I mean, they lost money | 9 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 10 | and so they lost money. To exclude them is | 10 | Q. | Well, we can talk about TD Bank. |
| 11 | just to exclude them and make the number | 11 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 12 | higher. I don't see the benefit of saying | 12 | A. | Okay. |
| 13 | "oh, I wish we could exclude these companies | 13 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 14 | because they lost money" and then the number | 14 | Q. | Doesn't matter. You know, if they're in the |
| 15 | will be higher. I don't - you can do that, | 15 |  | province with a business model that's not |
| 16 | but if you're trying to look back and say | 16 |  | designed to make money on insurance product, |
| 17 | what were the profits, that's what you want | 17 |  | you know, they may be here to say "look, |
| 18 | to know. If you want to exclude some | 18 |  | we're going to sell insurance, but it's |
| 19 | companies, go ahead and do that, but I don't | 19 |  | really part of a bigger plan for us. We're |
| 20 | see the appropriateness of just cherry | 20 |  | going to get customers there. We don't mind |
| 21 | picking who you want to exclude. | 21 |  | losing money and having negative ROEs." |
| 22 | MR. FELTHAM: | 22 |  | That might be like a loss leader type of |
| 23 | Q. But if an auto insurance company is | 23 |  | product to them and that's their |
| 24 | underwriting in the province and are | 24 |  | prerogative. But is it fair then to |
| 25 | consistently losing money, and if we include | 25 |  | effectively have the auto insurance consumer |


|  | Page 29 |  | Page 31 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | subsidize that type of business model? | 1 | hindsight review of their profits. But no, |
| 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 2 | our choice was to include all companies. |
| 3 | A. Well, you're asking me to make an assumption | 3 | The results are what they are. They do |
| 4 | that they are providing insurance as a loss | 4 | operate here and so, we didn't draw some |
| 5 | leader. | 5 | line, artificial line to say well, we're |
| 6 | FELTHAM: | 6 | going to exclude those companies that have |
| 7 | I am. | 7 | an ROE less than what we think should be if |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | ou wanted to stay around in the province. |
| 9 | A. And I'm not prepared to make that assumption | 9 | FELTHAM: |
| 10 | when I present my results of | 10 | Okay. Move on from that one. I'd like to |
| 11 | history is of the profits in the province. | 11 | go back to the answers in interrogatories, |
| 12 | FELTHAM: | 12 | which I think we're not on that document. |
| 13 | Q. But if that were the case? | 13 | I'd like to speak with you about commission |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | expenses. And if we go to page one, please, |
| 15 | A. Well, again, that's an if. It's a hypo | 15 | and these are your interrogatory responses |
| 16 | you're hypothesizing and I'm not prepared to | 16 | to the Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers |
| 17 | present results on a hypothesis. I'm only | 17 | questions. And I'm not going to read this, |
| 18 | prepared, which I did, to present results on | 18 | but if we go down to the last paragraph |
| 19 | the actual data that was available, not to | 19 | under number one, you indicate that the |
| 20 | say well, what if I exclude the companies | 20 | Newfoundland and Labrador 2016 average |
| 21 | without low negative ROE. You can do th | 21 | ommission ratio was 12.2 percent and the |
| 22 | calculation, but that's not what I chose to | 22 | remium tax rate, five percent. Is that |
| 23 | do because I don't know why their ROE was | 23 | correct? |
| 24 | negat | 24 | ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | MR. FELTHAM: | 25 | A. Yes, yeah. |
|  |  |  | Page 32 |
| 1 | Q. Okay. But you understand that by including | 1 | FELTHAM: |
| 2 | a company with a consistently negative ROE | 2 | Q. Okay. And again, other than you mentioned |
| 3 | from the past results, we do just - we get | 3 | comparing things for other provinces, you |
| 4 | those past results and we get the numbers, | 4 | ook no other means to determine |
| 5 | - | 5 | easonableness of the commission, average |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOT | 6 | commission ratio? Is that correct? |
| 7 | A. And what if that company | 7 | (9:45 a.m.) |
| 8 | MR. FELTHAM: | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | Q. Just let me finish, please. And but, it's | 9 | A. Well, no, I know what the commission ratio |
| 10 | not only the past because we are looking at | 10 | are, the commission rate paid to brokers. |
| 11 | that past history to determine whether or | 11 | So, it's 12 and a half percent, plus a |
| 12 | not rates have been adequate in Newfoundland | 12 | contingent commission. So, I would |
| 13 | and Labrador, and that's with a view to the | 13 | certainly say that I would know what's |
| 14 | future. | 14 | reasonable and what's not. |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | . FELTHAM: |
| 16 | A. I beg to differ. We presented the results | 16 | Q. And whether that rate is appropriate in the |
| 17 | including all companies. We were not asked | 17 | particular sales model that exists in |
| 18 | to draw a line in the sand and exclude those | 18 | Newfoundland and Labrador, you didn't do any |
| 19 | companies that had an ROE below a certain | 19 | analysis with respect to that? |
| 20 | number and to make, you know, some judgment | 20 | SS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | call and hypothesize that. And I'm not sure | 21 | A. I'm sorry, what is your question? I'm not |
| 22 | if you're presenting factual information for | 22 | following. |
| 23 | me to consider here what TD's results are in | 23 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 24 | other provinces, what their ROE is, and | 24 | Q. The 12.2 percent, you accepted it without |
| 25 | whether they should be excluded in any | 25 | doing any analysis as to whether that 12.2 |

1 percent is appropriate in the context -
2 MS. ELLIOTT:
3 A. I certainly -
4 MR. FELTHAM:
5 Q. - of the sales models in this province?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I certainly know what's appropriate or not for a commission rate. I know the rate is 12.5 percent for brokers and it's a lower cost if you're a direct writer. I'm certainly aware of what those numbers are and -
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. How do you know that's a reasonable rate?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I'm sorry, in what context are you saying the rate that's charged or what we pay brokers or whether that is -
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. The 12.2 percent.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well -

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. The ratio.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I'm sorry, what is your definition of reasonable? So, we can answer this effectively here.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Whether that's an appropriate commission ratio in the context of this province.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes, I believe it is an appropriate and reasonable number. It's in line with what brokers are paid.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. Did you do any examination of how automobile insurance is sold in Newfoundland and Labrador?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I do know how it's sold, yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. How did you - what did you do to determine that?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I know there's a mix. I know which companies are operating in the province, which companies are broker based and which companies are direct writers. I'm aware of that.

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## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. Okay. And the Campaign asked you some questions as well on this in the interrogatories and if we go to page nine. Questions actually are repeated at number five there. So, those are the questions and I'm not going to go through each one, but the answers are actually on - start on the next page. I want to take you to Answer A. So, the question here was - just, I guess, I should repeat that.

Okay. "How did you estimate your general expense ratios for the industry? A. What has happened to commissions over time?"
And, you note in the second sentence or third sentence, sorry, "as supported by GISA, the commissions, excluding contingent commissions, as a percentage of premiums in Newfoundland and Labrador for 2013 to 2016, the most recent report from GISA, were 11.3 percent, 11.8 percent, 12.2 percent and 12.1 percent respectively."

And then you refer to the contingent commission. So, can you help me out with that? Can you explain the concept of
contingent commission versus the other commission?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Um-hm. Well, the brokers are paid a standard commission rate of 12.5 percent per uniform, and then, contingent commission is contingent, depends upon the broker's performance and each company has a different arrangement that they would have with the broker. So, and the amount of this contingent commission that's paid to a broker would vary by things such as their growth in premium volume, the level of their premium volume, and their loss ratio results.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. So, more based on achievements in a larger book of business context versus individual sales?

## MS. ELLIOTT:

A. It can be growth level of volume of premium and results, yeah.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. Okay. And you also note in the same paragraph, and sentence-the last sentence

|  | Page 37 |  | Page 39 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | that there's been a shift in commissions. | 1 | they're operating Anthony Insurance and |
| 2 | You say, "These shifts in commissions | 2 | Macdonald Chisholm Trask, insurance brokers. |
| 3 | imply"-well, let me back up a sentence I | 3 | You're aware of that? |
| 4 | suppose. "Hence, most recently, the | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | commission rate excluding contingent | 5 | A. They would be an ownership arrangement which |
| 6 | commissions has increased from 2013 to 2016, | 6 | is different than a company arrangement. |
| 7 | and the contingent commissions have | 7 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 8 | decreased from 2013 to 2016." | 8 | Q. Okay, but they're a part of Intact's |
| 9 | ELLIOTT: | 9 | operation according to Intact. |
| 10 | A. Um-hm. | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | MR. FELTHAM: | 11 | A. That broker does not come (unintelligible) |
| 12 | Q. "These shifts in commissions imply that | 12 | the set of rates. We're dealing with |
| 13 | there may be a shift towards the use of | 13 | insurance companies here. |
| 14 | broker-based companies." And the sentence | 14 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 15 | carries on. Did you examine the ownership | 15 | Q. No, no, I'm not suggesting that they do. |
| 16 | arrangement of insurance brokerages in the | 16 | I'm just saying Intact has told us in its |
| 17 | province? | 17 | submission, "These are entities that we |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | operate." |
| 19 | Q. Intact has increased its market share in the | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | province, and it is a broker-based company, | 20 | A. Yeah. |
| 21 | and that may be driving it, yeah. | 21 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 22 | MR. FELTHAM: | 22 | Q. Okay? |
| 23 | Q. Yes, because you say, "A shift towards the | 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 24 | used of broker-based companies." | 24 | A. Um-hm, they're not insurance companies. |
| 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 25 | MR. FELTHAM: |
|  | Page 38 |  | Page 40 |
| 1 | A. Um-hm, um-hm. | 1 | Q. No, they're not. I understand, but the |
| 2 | MR. FELTHAM: | 2 | commissions that those brokers, Anthony |
| 3 | Q. So, and Intact, I think in their submission | 3 | Insurance, Macdonald Chisholm Trask, are |
| 4 | actually, they say they operate three brands | 4 | charging, the $121 / 2$ percent, plus whatever |
| 5 | in the province? | 5 | contingent commissions, they're ultimately |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 | staying now under the Intact umbrella, are |
| 7 | A. Um-hm. | 7 | they not? |
| 8 | MR. FELTHAM: | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | Q. Their own brands. Excuse me. And two of | 9 | A. Well, yes, they would roll through the |
| 10 | those are Anthony Insurance and Macdonald | 10 | Intact data that's reported to GISA that |
| 11 | Chisholm Trask Insurance? | 11 | we're using, yeah. |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 13 | A. Yeah, I'm sorry, they're brokers that you're | 13 | Q. And then, I mean there's other examples. |
| 14 | referring to; not brands. | 14 | So, you know, Johnson Insurance, locally. |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | Q. No, I say Intact referred to them as brands | 16 | A. I'm sorry, examples of what? |
| 17 | in their submission. That's not-I'm not | 17 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 18 | saying that's what they are. They're | 18 | Q. I'm going to give them to you. |
| 19 | brokers, I agree with you. | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | A. Oh. |
| 21 | A. The Intact Financial Corporation, Intact | 21 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 22 | Group, would have Novex Insurance as a brand | 22 | Q. Johnson Insurance in this province sells |
| 23 | insurer, yeah. | 23 | insurance, a brokerage, and they're owned by |
| 24 | MR. FELTHAM: | 24 | Royal Sun Alliance. Are you aware of that? |
| 25 | Q. Okay. Well, in any event, Intact notes | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |

A. I'm not sure who owns which broker.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay, fine.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And you mentioned that--well, I mean there
appears to be a shift in brokerages being
acquired by insurance companies. Are you-do
you have any knowledge of that or awareness
of it?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes. Yes, I do. Um-hm.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And then, you mentioned the shift toward
insurers selling their product through
brokerages versus direct selling?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah. Who owns a broker has nothing to do
with the set of-like the commission rate.
That's independent. It's who puts capital
in a broker. Whether the broker owns the--
self-owned, owner-operated or somebody else
that investing it in it like an insurance
company.
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Q. Yes, and I want to talk to you about that
because I had trouble understanding that,
why it makes no difference. And I note that
in your-on page 10 , the same page here of
your answers, and you-because we asked you
question.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Um-hm.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And you say in C, "The acquisition of
brokers by insurers does not dictate or
require a change in the commission
compensation structure," and I struggle with
that because, and this may be a simplistic
view of it, but in my mind once the insurer
acquires the brokerage that sells its
product, it's effectively direct selling,
but it's still collecting the commission
that it would be paying to a broker if it
didn't own the broker.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. It's not direct selling. It's a broker
relationship. If the broker comes in-the
consumer, sorry, the consumer comes in and

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    MR. FELTHAM: 1
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Q. Yes, and I want to talk to you about that because I had trouble understanding that, why it makes no difference. And I note that in your-on page 10 , the same page here of your answers, and you-because we asked you question.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Um-hm.
Q. And you say in C, "The acquisition of brokers by insurers does not dictate or require a change in the commission compensation structure," and I struggle with that because, and this may be a simplistic view of it, but in my mind once the insurer acquires the brokerage that sells its product, it's effectively direct selling, but it's still collecting the commission that it would be paying to a broker if it didn't own the broker.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. It's not direct selling. It's a broker relationship. If the broker comes in-the an expense to the insurer anymore? You know, if you have an independent broker and
Intact Insurance, but they're collecting a commission as well. And that commission ultimately finds its way into commission expenses which finds its way back into rates?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes, if brokers are paid $12 \frac{1}{2}$ percent, a broker owner-operator may decide to get other investors and they may find it advantageous to get Intact to be an investor, and maybe Intact owns half of the brokerage, 75 percent, 25 percent, whatever. It does not change the operation of that brokerage. Clearly, it may funnel more volume through to Intact. I understand that, but it does not mean that because you have a different ownership of a brokerage that they're still not getting compensated by $12^{1} / 2$ percent. You're making the assumption that they are, and you have evidence to present to say that.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. But here's how I look at it. Is it really an expense to the insurer anymore? You

|  | Page 45 |  | Page 47 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | I understand that, you know, Aviva or | 1 | brokerage, whatever the reason he's chosen |
| 2 | whoever is going to have to pay a commission | 2 | to do this, somebody has put capital in to |
| 3 | to that broker if it sells a policy. | 3 | get ownership of a brokerage. That does not |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | necessitate that they have to change their |
| 5 | A. Yeah, um-hm. | 5 | operating model of that brokerage. And |
| 6 | MR. FELTHAM: | 6 | secondly, the data that is reported to GISA |
| 7 | Q. That money, that commission paid, is an | 7 | is the commission amounts that are paid, and |
| 8 | expense to the insurer. It does not go back | 8 | these are the data that we use. So, we're |
| 9 | to the insurer in any way. It stays with | 9 | kind of going around in circles. How does |
| 10 | that little brokerage, but if Aviva-well, | 10 | the operating business model for a brokerage |
| 11 | let's not take Aviva because I don't know | 11 | change? And there's always different |
| 12 | which one they own, but let's take Intact | 12 | brokers out there. Be that what they may, |
| 13 | again. Intact pays a commission to Anthony | 13 | how they change, regardless this is the |
| 14 | Insurance for a policy that it sells. | 14 | commission amounts that are reported to GISA |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | that are paid. |
| 16 | A. Um-hm. | 16 | R. FELTHAM: |
| 17 | MR. FELTHAM: | 17 | Q. No, I totally appreciate that, that they are |
| 18 | Q. That money is really staying in Intact | 18 | still reported commissions and claimed as an |
| 19 | Insurance effectively? | 19 | expense by the insurers as part of their |
| 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | expense. And it makes its way into what the |
| 21 | A. Well, it depends on what their percentage of | 21 | expense ratio ultimately is and so on. |
| 22 | ownership is of that brokerage. | 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 23 | MR. FELTHAM: | 23 | A. Um-hm. |
| 24 | Q. Okay. | 24 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 25 | Q. And then, ultimately, what rates are |
|  | Page 46 |  | Page 48 |
| 1 | A. Whether it's a 100 percent owner or | 1 | required to achieve rate adequacy? |
| 2 | whatever. | 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 3 | MR. FELTHAM: | 3 | A. Um-hm. |
| 4 | Q. Okay. It could-that could matter. | 4 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 | Q. The problem I have is that while it's being |
| 6 | A. Sure. | 6 | claimed as an expense by an insurer--let's |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 | say for a moment that Anthony Insurance is |
| 8 | Q. Yes. | 8 | wholly owned by Intact, that they own all of |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | it. They've paid a commission. |
| 10 | A. But just because you have a new owner, if | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | somebody invested capital in a brokerage, | 11 | A. Um-hm. |
| 12 | that doesn't change the operation and the | 12 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 13 | operating model for that brokerage. | 13 | Q. Which ultimately is not really an expense. |
| 14 | MR. FELTHAM: | 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 15 | Q. Not even if it is the insurer that pays the | 15 | A. No, no, no. |
| 16 | commission - | 16 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | Q. It's staying within their operation. |
| 18 | A. We don't - | 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 19 | MR. FELTHAM: | 19 | A. No, no, no, no. No, they paid a commission. |
| 20 | Q. - and is the owner? | 20 | And at the end of the day, the Anthony |
| 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 21 | agency has all different costs, its salary, |
| 22 | A. Well, let's just put that aside that | 22 | its rent, and they collect this revenue and |
| 23 | somebody invested money and that allows that | 23 | its commission, $121 / 2$ percent. They collect |
| 24 | broker-maybe he is planning on retiring and | 24 | all that. That's their revenue in. They |
| 25 | this is his way to get the money out of the | 25 | have salaries, rent to pay out, and at the |


|  | $\text { Page } 49$ |  | Page 51 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | end of it that brokerage has a profit. And | 1 | circumstance to use, yes. |
| 2 | if Intact owns it, 100 percent, they're | 2 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 3 | getting the profit of the brokerage. | 3 | Q. Yes, okay. So, the 2.9 percent--maybe to |
| 4 | MR. FELTHAM: | 4 | help here, if we look at, in the report, |
| 5 | Q. Okay. | 5 | Table 6 which is on page 8 in the actual |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 | report documents. I just want to make sure |
| 7 | A. Yeah, that's how that works. | 7 | the source that the 2.9 percent comes from |
| 8 | MR. FELTHAM: | 8 | that I'm clear on that. |
| 9 | Q. But the commission finds its way, at the | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | full rate, into the expenses? | 10 | A. Um-hm. |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 12 | A. If that's their model that they're working | 12 | Q. Okay, so we have the table there. So, your |
| 13 | under, yes. | 13 | 2.9 percent figure in the answers there |
| 14 | MR. FELTHAM: | 14 | comes out of this table, 2014, 2015, 2016 |
| 15 | Q. Sorry, just see where I'm going next here. | 15 | pre-tax investment income rate? |
| 16 | The Answers to Interrogatories Document, and | 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 17 | over to page 6. And so, this time we are | 17 | A. Um-hm. |
| 18 | back into answers to IBC questions. And if | 18 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 19 | we do down to answer 5, our question 5, | 19 | Q. And you average those three, I assume, yes? |
| 20 | answer 5, and we have the IBC asking you a | 20 | That's the level of math. |
| 21 | question on question another intervener | 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 22 | asked you, and it says, "Ms. Elliott the | 22 | A. Yeah, that's pretty much it. Yeah. |
| 23 | intervener asked you to calculate the 2017 | 23 | (10:00 a.m.) |
| 24 | premium deficiency based on a higher | 24 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 25 | investment return such as six percent. | 25 | Q. Okay, and you're-and did you give any |
|  | Page 50 |  | Page 52 |
| 1 | Could you please comment on why you use 2.9 | 1 | consideration to using a greater period of |
| 2 | percent and the reasonableness of using a | 2 | time to do-come up with that the appropriate |
| 3 | return as high as 6 percent?" And your | 3 | average should be? |
| 4 | response was, "We use 2.9 percent as this is | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | the average investment rate, ROI, earned by | 5 | A. Well, we're trying to - |
| 6 | insurers in 2014 to 2016 based on the | 6 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 7 | financial data that the insurers provided to | 7 | Q. Three years just seems like a really short |
| 8 | the Office of the Superintendent of | 8 | period to me, that's all. |
| 9 | Insurance." And you go on to comment that | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | in your view that's-that average of the | 10 | A. Well, we want 2017 to reflect what we think |
| 11 | recent past is the reasonable estimate to | 11 | is happening, and the more recent timeframe |
| 12 | use. | 12 | would reflect what would be happening given |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 | what's going on in the markets. So, going |
| 14 | A. That was basis for the 2.9. | 14 | back to 2002, that might be-I don't know |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 | what the number might be. Ten percent. |
| 16 | Q. Yes. | 16 | That wouldn't be reasonable to assume that |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | you'd get ten percent in 2017. So, it was |
| 18 | A. Um-hm. | 18 | the view that the more recent timeframe is |
| 19 | MR. FELTHAM: | 19 | indicative of what will happen in the |
| 20 | Q. And you say that picking that period, 2014 | 20 | subsequent year. |
| 21 | to 2016, is the appropriate period to | 21 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 22 | choose? | 22 | Q. So, but in order to get more representative |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | average of a history period, wouldn't it |
| 24 | A. Well, it's what, in doing the calculations, | 24 | make sense to include more years that just |
| 25 | we found appropriate and reasonable in the | 25 | three? |

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I'm not trying to-just say, what do we think will happen in 2017?
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And your view, we should base that off the three previous years?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah, and that's what we did, right. Right, it's-I don't believe interest rates and the returns for the company, and I know for a fact what they are now in 2017, and they're in that $2 \frac{1}{2}$ to 3 percent range. We know what the Government of Canada bonds are.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Yes. And do you recall when Mr. Mason was asking you questions and you know-because he
spent some time talking about the time
periods used for various things as well.
The notion of cycles, do you recall that?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Sure. Well, you're not-

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Vaguely at least?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Vaguely at least.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. Yes, okay.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. I don't recall it much better than that,
but-and again, I'll put this to you. It
seems to me that if we take a very narrow
window, we're not really capturing those
longer cycles in the market.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. This is no cycle in the market. We're trying to estimate what the ROI will be in 2017. Simply that. I'm fully aware of what the Government of Canada bonds are, and I know they're not five percent. I don't need to have a long-term interest rate to forecast what 2017 will be. We already know like doing this work. So, I know it's going to be in that $2 \frac{1}{2}$ to 3 percent range. I don't if it'll be 2.5 or 2.9 or what exactly the number will be, but I'm pretty certain it's going to be in that range. And the data is out now, and I know that I was right with the number that I used, what was

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insurer. Yeah.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Right, okay. And then, you go on to say, the same paragraph, "These ROI amounts are company-wide values. They're not line of business or province specific because investments held by insurers are not line of business or province specific." So, they're comingling all of that there?

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MS. ELLIOTT:
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A. They have a big pot of investments.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Yes.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Yes, sure. And then, the next paragraph,
"Each insurer is required to report amongst
other financial data, its investment income
that it allocates to each province for the
automobile line of business to GISA. This
is a notional allocation process completed
by each insurer." So, the insurer, they
have to report the investment income that it
allocates. I get that, but the method or

|  | Page 57 |  | Page 59 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | the manner of allocation, all of that is | 1 | a different UL and ALAE, if you recall he |
| 2 | within the domain of the insurer, correct? | 2 | took you back and said, look, 2014, you |
| 3 | How it allocates? | 3 | should use that year. |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | A. Yeah, I didn't use that number, but yes, | 5 | A. I don't have it in front of me, but okay, |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { th } \\ \text { EL } \end{gathered}$ | 7 | yeah. |
| 8 | Q. Sorry? | 8 | Q. Okay, all right, well I'll ask you the |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | question and we'll go through, okay. So we |
| 10 | A. I did not use that number that is allocated | 10 | can look at Question 4, I'm not going to go |
| 11 | notionally by the company. | 11 | through each one of these, but 4 we can work |
| 12 | MR. FELTHAM: | 12 | on. And he said, the question was, "If the |
| 13 | Q. Okay. | 13 | UL and ALAE is $\$ 354.37$ per car and the |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | operating expenses are reduced by 6.2 |
| 15 | A. I did not use that. We use a number that's | 15 | percent, as noted above, what is the return |
| 16 | reported to OSFI, the federal regulator of | 16 | on equity for auto insurers in 2017? And |
| 17 | the ROI that is audited by PWCs and Ernst | 17 | just to help us remember the figures that, |
| 18 | and Young, et cetera. We did not use the | 18 | that \$354.37 UL and ALAE come from your |
| 19 | dollar amount that is notionally allocated | 19 | schedule of documents to your report. |
| 20 | by companies in their GISA reporting. We | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | did not use that. | 21 | A. Uh-hm, yes. |
| 22 | MR. FELTHAM: | 22 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 23 | Q. Okay. Perhaps I misunderstood. So, you did | 23 | Q. If we go to Appendix A, page 3 of 5, so then |
| 24 | not use the numbers that would have involved | 24 | if we look across, we've got the Ultimate |
| 25 | notional allocation process by the insurers? | 25 | Loss \& ALE Cost/Car column, very top one, |
|  | Page 58 |  | Page 60 |
|  | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 | bodily injury, $\$ 354.37$, and this is for |
| 2 | A. No. | 2 | accident year 2014. |
| 3 | MR. FELTHAM: | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | Q. Okay. I think I misunderstood. Okay, and | 4 | A. Correct, yes. |
| 5 | staying with the Answers to Interrogatories | 5 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 6 | still, I'd like to go to page 2, please. | 6 | Q. As of June 30th, 2017, so as we know it now. |
| 7 | And just to set the stage if you will, | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 | there's really a series of questions and | 8 | A. Right. |
| 9 | answers here that all arise from | 9 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 10 | hypotheticals I guess that Mr. Mason had | 10 | Q. Not now, but June 30th, last year. |
| 11 | given you, changing inputs for UL and ALAE | 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | and other items I guess, and asking you to | 12 | A. Then, yes. |
| 13 | recalculate with certain assumptions. Is | 13 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 14 | that correct? | 14 | Q. But that's important in terms of what I'm |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | going to talk to you about. And can you |
| 16 | A. Yes, different expense ratios and, I don't | 16 | maybe just explain for us again what that |
| 17 | have it in front of me, but - | 17 |  |
| 18 | MR. FELTHAM: | 18 | ALAE Cost/Per, \$354.37 is? |
| 19 | Q. Primarily it was, I think ratios and UL and | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | ALAE changes. | 20 | A. That's the amount of losses and allocated |
| 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 21 | loss adjustment expenses that are estimated |
| 22 | A. I think it was ROI changes, not ULAE, but | 22 | will ultimately be paid when all the claims |
| 23 | anyway, yeah. | 23 | are settled and closed for the claims that |
| 24 | MR. FELTHAM: | 24 | occurred in the accident year, 2014, what |
| 25 | Q. No, no, he definitely asked you to consider | 25 | that cost will be per vehicle, the claim's |


|  | Page 61 |  | Page 63 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | component, yeah. | 1 | on to say you don't agree with the |
| 2 | MR. FELTHAM: | 2 | hypothetical, but there it is. And I gather |
| 3 | Q. And that figure, whatever it is, and the | 3 | what this arose from, what Mr. Mason had |
| 4 | operating expenses, they have to come out | 4 | been asking you about that kind of gave rise |
| 5 | of, from the premiums collected and the | 5 | to these calculations was, the concern he |
| 6 | investment returns in order to figure out | 6 | was raising, I'll ask if you remember or |
| 7 | what's left over for profits? | 7 | agree with me, the concern over the |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | reliability of the UL and ALAE cost per |
| 9 | A. Yes, you take the losses, add up all the | 9 | vehicle figure due to the fact that reserves |
| 10 | operating costs and taxes, commissions. | 10 | might be overstated or out of line in the |
| 1 | FELTHAM: | 11 | sort of more recent year, versus what they |
| 12 | Q. Yes. And I believe the figure that you were | 12 | might look like more historically, do you |
| 13 | using was \$406.00, instead of \$354.37, do | 13 | remember that? |
| 14 | you recall that? | 14 | 0:15 a.m.) |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | A. What we use is an average of the last three | 16 | A. Well, these are estimates, so in terms of |
| 17 | years, yeah. | 17 | the 2017 year at the point of doing these |
| 18 | FELTHAM: | 18 | calculations, we only have the first half of |
| 19 | Q. And maybe what we will do is go back to, I | 19 | the year available, so we're trying to |
| 20 | think we can leave that chart and go back to | 20 | estimate, it's not even a matter of case |
| 21 | page 2 of the answers, and we can actually | 21 | reserves being too high or too low, they |
| 22 | just review the question so we have the full | 22 | weren't available for the second half, so we |
| 23 | context. Okay, so again, "If the UL and | 23 | were really trying to say what will 2017 be |
| 24 | ALAE is \$354.37 per car and the operating | 24 | and we only know the first six months of the |
| 25 | expenses are reduced by 6.2 percent, as | 25 | claim was not how the weather was in the |
|  | Page 62 |  |  |
| 1 | noted above, what is the return on equity | 1 | second half in 2017 and what claims resulted |
| 2 | for auto insurers in 2017?" And your | 2 | in the second half, that we're dealing with |
| 3 | response was, "Similar to Question No. 1 | 3 | only six months of data doing this |
| 4 | above, it's unclear if the request to apply | 4 | calculation. In terms, you know, that's an |
| 5 | an expense ratio of 23 percent or 18.2 | 5 | estimate looking forward to say what do I |
| 6 | percent, we therefore provide our response | 6 | think 2017 will be, given what I know in the |
| 7 | with both hypothetical expense ratios for | 7 | other years that have occurred. This is a |
| 8 | the sensitivity test." And under the next | 8 | little separate issue from case reserves |
| 9 | page, the second bullet, "The accident year | 9 | being too high or too low because we're |
| 10 | 2017 estimate of the UL and ALAE cost per | 10 | trying to forecast forward for a year that |
| 11 | vehicle presented in our report is | 11 | hasn't even occurred yet and we don't have |
| 12 | approximately \$406.00, and the expense | 12 | data for the second half. |
| 13 | provision is 26.2 percent." So that's where | 13 | . FELTHAM: |
| 14 | I was, the \$406.00, that's where you affirm | 14 | Q. The case reserves, though, and the |
| 15 | that's the number you were using? | 15 | supplemental reserve, they're included in |
| 16 | ELLIOTT: | 16 | that figure, well in 2014 it was \$354.37? |
| 17 | A. Uh-hm. | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 | MR. FELTHAM: | 18 | A. Yes, so we're using the prior three years, |
| 19 | Q. "Using a hypothetical estimate of the UL \& | 19 | averaging that and trying to forecast that |
| 20 | ALAE for accident year 2017 of \$354.37, | 20 | forward for 2017. So it is an estimate that |
| 21 | instead of \$406.00 and an expense ratio of | 21 | we are providing and it's dependent upon the |
| 22 | 18.2 percent, instead of 26.2 percent, and | 22 | GISA data that's reported to us, the case |
| 23 | no other changes and assumptions, increases | 23 | reserve, et cetera, yeah. |
| 24 | the 2017 accident year ROE estimate from -9 | 24 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 25 | percent to +8.7 percent." And then you go | 25 | Q. And that figure of $\$ 406.00$ is overstated |


|  | Page 65 |  | $\text { Page } 67$ <br> that time, and the frequency rate did |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | because reserves are overstated, the result | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | is that the actual experience, as it turns | 2 |  | decline, coincident with the introduction of |
| 3 | out, might be a lot different than the | 3 |  | the reforms and that was not built into the |
| 4 | calculation as it comes out with \$406.00 | 4 |  | rates that were set in that province and |
| 5 | unit. | 5 |  | then as a result, in hindsight, the rates |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 |  | were too high and therefore, the ROE was |
| 7 | A. Yeah, that's the nature of the beast, you | 7 |  | beyond the, much higher than the targets, so |
| 8 | know, it's an estimate, it could be too low | 8 |  | that's what happened there. |
| 9 | or it could be too high, either way, yeah. | 9 | MR. FELTHAM: |  |
| 10 | MR. FELTHAM: | 10 | Q. | Okay, and I gather that was Mr. Mason was |
| 11 | Q. And we can't see, looking at your Appendix | 11 |  | suggesting was that look, we should use a |
| 12 | A, what component of that is made up from | 12 |  | lower figure than $\$ 406.00$ because that's |
| 13 | reserves, we can't-there's nothing to tell | 13 |  | very current, we should use a figure |
| 14 | us - | 14 |  | something like for the 2014, it's matured, |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 |  | right, more time has gone by, we know now |
| 16 | A. Not in the way that we presented it, I mean, | 16 |  | whether the reserves, you know, that were |
| 17 | if I was asked for that, yes, but it's not | 17 |  | paid out, we have more of a real number, if |
| 18 | presented that way. | 18 |  | you will, then one that's made up of |
| 19 | MR. FELTHAM: | 19 |  | reserves. |
| 20 | Q. And I'll talk to you about that because I | 20 |  | ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | think what he was concerned about was that | 21 | A. | Well certainly looking at 2014, I agree it's |
| 22 | the result that the, you know, if the actual | 22 |  | more mature than 2016, sure, but I don't |
| 23 | payout for the costs for the ultimate loss | 23 |  | think it's reasonable to take 2014 and not |
| 24 | and the ALAE costs, were a lot less than | 24 |  | project it forward for what the cost level |
| 25 | what was reserved, then the insurer could | 25 |  | would be in 2017 because we know that claim |
|  | Page 66 |  |  | Page 68 |
| 1 | end up with actually a much higher ROE than | 1 |  | costs increase each year, inflation, CPI or |
| 2 | was anticipated? | 2 |  | whatever measurement of loss trend would be |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 |  | positive, so to take 2014 and say that |
| 4 | A. Yeah, and we won't know 2017 for a number of | 4 |  | value, $\$ 354$ would be unchanged in 2017 or in |
| 5 | years, so, yeah. | 5 |  | 2018, 2019, that it would never change, |
| 6 | MR. FELTHAM: | 6 |  | that's not realistic. |
| 7 | Q. And do you recall him giving the example | 7 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 8 | from 2002 in Nova Scotia where in that case | 8 | Q. | And just accounting for those items that you |
| 9 | he suggested that the estimated ROE in | 9 |  | mentioned, would that get us to $\$ 406.00$ in |
| 10 | hearing process was in the negative, but it | 10 |  | that range? Would they be that significant? |
| 11 | actually turned out to be, in reality, once | 11 |  | ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | time went by, the ROE turned out to be | 12 | A. | Well our view was to take three most recent |
| 13 | something like 10 percent. | 13 |  | year which reflects different experience, it |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 |  | can be more claims in one year, less in |
| 15 | A. Well I think, you know, to make sure the | 15 |  | another, so we don't know what 2017 will be. |
| 16 | understanding of that point is clear, in | 16 |  | It kind of gives you an average of results, |
| 17 | Nova Scotia looking forward, you know, the | 17 |  | if we believe or we've estimated as best we |
| 18 | ROE did become quite high in the province. | 18 |  | can the claims costs for each of those three |
| 19 | When the reforms were introduced there was | 19 |  | years and we think they're all reasonable |
| 20 | an estimate that the severity amount for | 20 |  | estimate and then take an average of that, |
| 21 | each claim, the costs for each claim, would | 21 |  | which are all projected out to 2017. |
| 22 | reduce as a result of the reforms, but it | 22 |  | FELTHAM: |
| 23 | hadn't been anticipated that there would be | 23 | Q. | And I guess the, we'll call it the downside, |
| 24 | a very steep decline in the frequency rate | 24 |  | if you will, of using those - that more recent |
| 25 | that wasn't built into the costing model at | 25 |  | time period is that you do have this issue |


|  | Page 69 | Page 71 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | with respect to more uncertainty around | 1 | MR. FELTHAM: |  |
| 2 | accuracy of reserves and whether that ends | 2 | Q. | But doing that, well maybe you can explain |
| 3 | up being what the true experience is for | 3 |  | what it is-can you explain for us what a |
| 4 | claims? | 4 |  | paid to incur ratio and average incurred |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 |  | loss? |
| 6 | A. Yeah, it's a trade-off. | 6 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 | A | Well average incurred loss is really just |
| 8 | Q. Yeah, okay. So you mentioned before and I | 8 |  | the claim amount and the severity and you're |
| 9 | was going to ask you about this, so I'm glad | 9 |  | looking at how that changes over time, and |
| 10 | you brought it up, but you weren't asked to | 10 |  | then the ratio of paid to incurred, again |
| 11 | do an analysis with respect to the reserves, | 11 |  | you want to look at is there a change over |
| 12 | you mentioned - | 12 |  | time in that relationship, is it increasing, |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 |  | is there more being paid with respect to the |
| 14 | A. No, we looked at the estimate of the | 14 |  | amount that's incurred, or is it less, so we |
| 15 | ultimate losses and what the reserves that | 15 |  | look at those patterns. |
| 16 | are carried and what they should ultimately | 16 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 17 | be, we just didn't present out findings, | 17 | Q. | In the patterns and what might that help us |
| 18 | broken down in any little gritty detail. | 18 |  | see, in terms of the patterns? |
| 19 | MR. FELTHAM: | 19 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 20 | Q. Okay, because I father there is an analysis | 20 | A. | If the paid to incurred ratio is decreasing, |
| 21 | you can do to sort of break out the actual | 21 |  | that would be an indication that the case |
| 22 | amount paid versus the case reserves | 22 |  | reserves are stronger and vice versa. |
| 23 | historically? | 23 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | Q | So if the company's reserve setting practice |
| 25 | A. Uh-hm, yes. | 25 |  | had changed, for example, and now reserves |
|  | Page 70 |  |  | Page 72 |
| 1 | MR. FELTHAM: | 1 |  | were being increased, compared to the past, |
| 2 | Q. And my understanding is this is called a | 2 |  | they were putting larger reserves on files, |
| 3 | paid to incur ratio and average incurred | 3 |  | that analysis would allow us to see that? |
| 4 | loss, does that make sense? | 4 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 | A. | And we look at the components and we look at |
| 6 | A. Yeah, we look at it, yeah. | 6 |  | the components to see if the loss |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 |  | development factors are changing, so that's |
| 8 | Q. Okay, and has that been done here? | 8 |  | all part of the review, yeah. |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 10 | A. Have I done that one? | 10 | Q. | So that type of analysis, the paid to |
| 11 | MR. FELTHAM: | 11 |  | incurred and the average incurred loss, that |
| 12 | Q. Yes. | 12 |  | hasn't been performed here? |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 14 | A. Yes. | 14 | A. | No, I did not say that, I said that we |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 |  | complete many different steps, including |
| 16 | Q. Okay, and has it been produced for the Board | 16 |  | that as part of our XL models, which are |
| 17 | or any of the Intervenors? | 17 |  | massive files, and they're not all produced, |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 |  | they're internal working papers, but yeah, |
| 19 | A. No, I have not produced those exhibits, but | 19 |  | to get to the estimate of the ultimate loss |
| 20 | in terms of our analysis of estimating what | 20 |  | amount, we look at all those components. |
| 21 | the ultimate losses are, we go through a | 21 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 22 | number of steps to develop those estimates | 22 | Q. | And do you know here today whether, because |
| 23 | and not all our working papers are included | 23 |  | you spoke of the patterns, whether any |
| 24 | in the new list, XL files and they're not | 24 |  | patterns emerged here with respect to, you |
| 25 | all included in this. | 25 |  | know, historical change in reserve setting? |

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, there were no patterns that were evident here using this June 30th, data that there was anything unusual, and remember, this is a mix of all the companies' data together, and growth of one insurer in a marketplace, decline of another, so we're dealing with aggregated industry data, which is different that if you're an individual insurance company looking at your own data.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay, but that analysis is something that can be done, I guess you just haven't provided it, as part of the report. Is that something that can be done and provided to us?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Those exhibits of ratios of paid to incurred, they're all available through the GISA files as well.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. But it takes something to get it from the GISA files into a format where we can actually see -
MS. ELLIOTT:
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1 A. It's out in PDF, you can read it.
2 MR. FELTHAM:
3 Q. And is that what's referred to as the paid
4 to incurred ratio and average incurred loss,
5 the actual calculations and -
6 MS. ELLIOTT:
7 A. It's a GISA exhibit, yeah.
8 MR. FELTHAM:
9 Q. And what GISA exhibit specifically?
10 MS. ELLIOTT:
11 A. I think it's 7001.
12 MR. FELTHAM:
13 Q. And just to be clear, your recollection is
that looking historically back-and I'm not talking about just three years, but going back further in time, there were no patterns that emerged that caused you to consider there were changes in reserve settings such that reserves appeared to be larger than in the past, in recent years?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, not in the-no.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Now I was asking those questions because I gather from my understanding was that in

2002 that analysis was provided to the regulator in Nova Scotia, and so I was somewhat surprised, I guess, that we didn't see a similar analysis here, that's the basis for my questions. So getting back to your answer though, based on what Mr. Mason asked you to do and using a 354.37 ultimate loss and ALAE figure and expense ratio of 18.2 percent, versus the one you used in your report of 26.2 , just those changes actually took the 2017 accident year ROE estimate from a negative of almost a full 10 percent, right around to a positive of 8.7 percent.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Which is actually fairly close to the 10 percent benchmark even.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. That's right, yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay, those are all my questions, thank you. CHAIR:
Q. Thank you. Mr. Fraize?
A. Yes, that would be correct, yes.

FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Pardon me?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Okay, and basically you said no companies were excluded, so they were all put into the pot, so to speak? You looked at all the companies, those that made money, more money than others and those that made less money, is that correct?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. We were looking at the aggregated data, yes. 2

FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Did you take a look at why some companies were more profitable than others?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, well, the expense ratio for companies is in a relatively narrow band, what differentiates profit typically between companies, whether they make more or lose money, would be their loss experience, so they could have had, you know, a large loss, million-dollar loss, something, so the driver of whether you make money or lose money is typically by claims experience, higher loss ratios.
FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. The reason why I'm asking that, there seems to be a tendency in just some articles I read that the, especially in the United States, the expenses for insurance companies are going down, in terms of pulling out their insurance policies, part of it, they're booking their insurance through the Internet; in other words, you can direct,

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you call in and you provide your driver's abstract and bingo, you got a price. They seem to be able to control or reduce their costs.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Uh-hm.

FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Have you looked at how the companies operate in this province to see if they should be reducing their costs in a comparable way?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I think what you're referring to is the direct writers who are not even necessarily calling in, you're doing it, applying for your insurance online, you enter in the appropriate information, but different companies have different business models, you know, there are broker-based companies and some consumers to deal directly with a broker, and other people like to do their business online, in a selfdirected manner, so both models exist and consumers have the option to go to the direct online model and insurance companies with a direct model would have a lower
operating cost because they don't have the 12.5 percent commission rate that a brokerbased company has. So in the province consumers have the choice, which, where they want to go to and they do so accordingly.
(10:30 a.m.)
FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Do you also agree that the insurance companies are moving towards call centres? For instance, even the adjustors, some of the adjustors on accidents in this province, you're dealing with someone from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, PEI?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well you have two points there. The claims operation, the handling and the management of claims, a call centre is pretty typical. To do that, you call in your claim and it's handled. With respect to companies, some entities, larger companies, the group will have five, six, two, three, whatever number of individual insurance companies and within that group they could have different models for distributing their product. So Intact could have a company that's a broker-based
company and they could have a company that's a direct writer, so Intact would have a Belair insurance, which is direct, online, and they would have, Intact Insurance, or Nordic-or Novex where you use a broker, so FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. So more profitable insurance companies, you made a reference that some may have had major losses, but is it not also true that some of these companies have a model which is far more efficient in putting out the insurance product?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. It's a different model, so consumers -

FRAIZE, Q.C.:
Q. Some have a more profitable model?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I wouldn't say it's a lower cost model and that's built into their pricing, so if one company has an expense ratio of 22 percent and another company has an expense ratio of 28 percent, those differences would be built into their premium. So the one with the 22 percent cost structure, that's how their rates are set and the one with the 28

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | percent cost structure, that's in those | 1 | provided by the Campaign authored by Dr. |
| 2 | rates, so that doesn't make the profit | 2 | Lazar, if I'm saying his name right, and |
| 3 | different, it just makes the premium lower | 3 | Prisman. And, of course, when you did your |
| 4 | on a 22 percent expense cost basis. | 4 | material, did your reports, I guess the |
| 5 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 5 | latest back in March or so, I'm not sure of |
| 6 | Q. If an insurance company was able to reduce | 6 | the exact dates, you didn't have the benefit |
| 7 | the bricks and mortar, the buildings they | 7 | of this document, of course. |
| 8 | have, that reduces cost, correct? | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | A. It wasn't provided at that time. |
| 10 | A. Which should reduce the premium. | 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 1 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 11 | Q. No, of course. Have you looked at it since |
| 12 | Q. Like the banks now are reducing a number of | 12 | this all started? |
| 13 | branches to reduce their costs and some of | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | the insurance companies are able to | 14 | A. I did look at the report when it was |
| 15 | manoeuvre such that they have call centres, | 15 | provided, yes. |
| 16 | so I'm just saying that some of the | 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 17 | insurance companies have a better model of | 17 | Q. The reason I think we should speak about it |
| 18 | operations and consequently their costs are | 18 | a little bit is that you're going to be |
| 19 | lower, hence they have higher profits? | 19 | finished here and leave and then Dr. Lazar |
| 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | and Dr.-well I don't know if Dr. Prisman is |
| 21 | A. No, I disagree. Yes, you can have a | 21 | coming or not, but anyway, somebody is |
| 22 | different structure to operate such that | 22 | coming and they're going to, and they're |
| 23 | your expenses are lower and the lower | 23 | suggesting, of course, to some extent that |
| 24 | expense cost would be used in the pricing | 24 | the results that you've created or |
| 25 | model that lowers the premium, but that does | 25 | generated, the information you've provided |
|  | Page 82 |  | Page 84 |
| 1 | not drive higher profits because they lower | 1 | is not accurate, not reliable for some |
| 2 | expense ratio was used to set the premiums, | 2 | reason and so you should look at, the Board |
| 3 | which were then lower as well. | 3 | should look at what they have said as being |
| 4 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 4 | the more appropriate approach. So I want to |
| 5 | Q. So one of the things we're talking about is | 5 | just ask you a few questions about some of |
| 6 | lower premiums, correct? So if they have a | 6 | that, if I can. |
| 7 | more efficient cost model, the premiums go | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 | down? | 8 | A. Okay. |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | A. Yes, if your expenses are lower, all else | 10 | Q. Particularly, for example, if we can start |
| 1 | being equal your premiums would be lower. | 11 | with the issue of ROI and I don't know if |
| 12 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 12 | you can get up this report of Lazar and |
| 13 | Q. As far as I know we still have insurance | 13 | Prisman, okay, at page 30 if I can bring you |
| 14 | competition in this province? They compete | 14 | to that, thank you, that's it. And so, |
| 15 | against each other? | 15 | these are, there's a series of six bullets, |
| 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 16 | do you see those, Ms. Elliott? One of those |
| 17 | A. Correct. | 17 | is the fifth bullet, they say "we've done |
| 18 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 18 | this"--I guess this is the authors of this |
| 19 | Q. Okay. No further questions. | 19 | report saying "we've done this using the |
| 20 | CHAIR: | 20 | following assumptions", what they describe |
| 21 | Q. Mr. Stamp. | 21 | in the paragraph above that if more |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | reasonable assumptions are used, that's what |
| 23 | Q. Yes, thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Elliott, | 23 | they say and how they characterize it, and |
| 24 | I'd like to focus on a couple of issues | 24 | they say "an expected investment income |
| 25 | associated with a report that's been | 25 | return on equity of 6 percent." Now I don't |

know if that means, if that means ROI or
ROE, do you know what they're referring to
there?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I believe they're referring to ROI, but it's
not framed the way I would have framed it.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Sure. I think it is possibly referring to
ROI but there's a bit of confusion, I agree.
In any event, staying with that thought then
on that point, being a reference to ROI, if
you could just-if we could just turn back to
the Table 7 in that same report? It's at
page 13 of the report, if that helps. Okay,
there's enough of the year report that I can
see what I need to do. So, Ms. Elliott,
look, I want to draw your attention to the
line which is one, two, three, four, five, I
think from the bottom, so you got pre-tax,
pre-tax, pre-tax, premiums and equity,
investment income and equity, so I'm looking
at that line there, do you see it?
Q. And so it's a division, of course, to get that number apparently, but from 2012 2016, the authors of this report come up with investment income to equity, is that ROI? Is that what they're thinking about?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, this is not-ROI is Return On your Investments which is a ratio of your investment income divided by your invested assets. What's presented her in this row is the investment income divided by the equity and the equity does not equal the invested assets.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Right. I'm trying-this is what I'm trying to understand actually. Those rates that we have here ranging from 15.08 percent in 2012 to 6.74 percent in 2016 and just before I go to the next chart, are they arrived at in, let's say, 2016, is the $\$ 13,217,000.00$ divided by $\$ 196,000,000.00$, is that the two numbers above there?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. It's a little confusing, but the investment income divided by equity is just the ratio

| 1 | Q. | And so it's a division, of course, to get |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 |  | that number apparently, but from 2012 - |
| 3 |  | 2016, the authors of this report come up |
| 4 |  | with investment income to equity, is that |
| 5 | ROI? Is that what they're thinking about? |  |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 7 | A. | No, this is not-ROI is Return On your |
| 8 |  | Investments which is a ratio of your |
| 9 |  | investment income divided by your invested |
| 10 |  | assets. What's presented her in this row is |
| 11 |  | the investment income divided by the equity |
| 12 |  | and the equity does not equal the invested |
| 13 | assets. |  |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 15 | Q. | Right. I'm trying--this is what I'm trying |
| 16 | to understand actually. Those rates that we |  |
| 17 | have here ranging from 15.08 percent in 2012 |  |
| 18 | to 6.74 percent in 2016 and just before I go |  |
| 19 | to the next chart, are they arrived at in, |  |
| 20 | let's say, 2016, is the $\$ 13,217,000.00$ |  |
| 21 | divided by $\$ 196,000,000.00$, is that the two |  |
| 22 | numbers above there? |  |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 24 | A. | It's a little confusing, but the investment |
| 25 | income divided by equity is just the ratio |  |

2 STAMP, Q.C.:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { A. Yes. } \\
& \text { STAMP, Q.C.: } \\
& \text { Q. And what I'm assuming the authors of this } \\
& \text { other report are saying is that they're } \\
& \text { comparing your } 2.4 \text { percent and saying it's } \\
& \text { not reasonable, it should be } 6.74 \text { percent. } \\
& \text { MS. ELLIOTT: } \\
& \text { A. That's my understanding. } \\
& \text { STAMP, Q.C.: } \\
& \text { Q. And so we have, in their report, that Table } \\
& 7 \text { that we just looked at a few minutes ago } \\
& \text { ranging from } 15.08 \text { percent in } 2012-\text { so, it } \\
& \text { would be all in the right hand column for } \\
& \text { our purposes of comparison-they have } 15.08, \\
& \text { you have } 4 . \text { They have } 10.93 \text { for } 2013 ; \text { you } \\
& \text { have } 2.8 . \text { They have } 13 \text { percent for } 2014 ; \\
& \text { you have } 3.9 . \text { They have } 14.44 \text { for } 2015 ; \\
& \text { where as you have } 2.3 . \text { They have } 2016 \text { at } \\
& \text { 6.4 percent; whereas you have } 2.4 \text { percent. } \\
& \text { So, what I'd like to know from you is, is } \\
& \text { the manner in which they have created a } \\
& \text { number which I presume they are referring to } \\
& \text { as ROI, is that how it's calculated, the way } \\
& \text { that they've done it? I mean, it seems like } \\
& \text { a very simple way and of course, it's }
\end{aligned}
$$

        fundamentally different from yours.
        MS. ELLIOTT:
    A. Right. No, because the return on investment
        rate are your investment income including
        the realized capital gains and losses,
        that's included in the number that we
        present and it's taken as a ratio of the
        average at the beginning of the year and the
        end of the year of your investment assets
        that you have. So, all your investments,
        your bonds and your stocks and everything
        else. And these are the actual return on
        investment rates that are reported in the,
        what's referred to as P\&C-1, the financial
        statement that is audited and each company
        is required to file this annually with the
        federal regulatory OSFI. So, our numbers
        are different. What Lazar has presented is
        a ratio of the investment income as he has
        extracted it from the GISA exhibit divided
        by equity and equity in invested assets are
        not the same thing.
    (10:45 a.m.)
    Page 89

1
opinion, to have done an ROI calculation the way this was done in Table 7?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, because it's not an ROI. They are not the invested assets; it's equity. They are two different things.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Right. So, even though he does this calculation, we can see the calculation, and he describes the result and you get the answer from the division as and ROI, it's not an ROI.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, because we know that companies, insurance companies are required to invest conservatively. Most of their investments, a large proportion are in government grade bonds. And we know that government grade bonds are risk free with a very low interest rate. And so, if you see this measurement as presented by Lazar, you know, double digit, 15 percent, we know that that would be a red flag because we know that government bonds that companies invest in are not 15 percent. So, it's a different, Page 92
it's something else. It's not an ROI.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Whoever does this and gets those rates, I want them to be looking after my money.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes, me too, yes.

STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. If you can just turn, Ms. Elliott, to page 15 of yours, that is and it's Table 9. Do you see that? It's page 15 , sorry.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. I'm sorry, I misspoke. It's the Lazar Report. I apologize for that. Page 15, thank you. Table 9. Thank you. So, this is where they are saying, they're comparing the GISA pre-tax, what they call GISA pretax investment returns and those of Oliver Wyman. Now, I know yours came from the table at page 6 that we looked at a moment ago. And this is what he has described as investment income rates. So, he uses these rates, his rate that he's developed the way we just described it and you commented on to


|  | Page 97 |  | Page 99 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | so they attribute this to an Oliver Wyman | 1 | report to take a different set of expense |
| 2 | data, but it's actually GISA data. | 2 | percentages? |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | A. Yes. | 4 | A. I have no idea why, I don't know. |
| 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 6 | Q. So, in the right hand column at Table 10 of | 6 | Q. Does that make any sense? |
| 7 | the Lazar report-if you can just pop that | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 | back up again, thank you. So, they show two | 8 | A. No, I don't agree with their number. |
| 9 | columns for those years, GISA and Oliver | 9 | They're missing a component of the general |
| 10 | Wyman. The Oliver Wyman, they seem to | 10 | expenses. |
| 11 | imply, I guess, that is somehow you made | 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 12 | these numbers up, but they are right out of | 12 | Q. So, you're not comparing apples and apples. |
| 13 | GISA. | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | A. Right. |
| 15 | A. Correct. | 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | Q. Can I just turn to page 7 of the Oliver |
| 17 | Q. And they suggest that the column that they | 17 | Wyman report please? The bottom of the page |
| 18 | use, GISA numbers, they pull that out of, I | 18 | please. Do you see the paragraph, Ms. |
| 19 | guess, the same report maybe. | 19 | Elliott, beginning "since 2012"? |
| 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | A. No, they pulled that out of 9501 . What | 21 | A. Yes, um-hm. |
| 22 | they're presenting is a subset of the | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | general expenses. So, they're both from | 23 | Q. It says, "since 2012 the expense costs and |
| 24 | GIS, but one is a subset of the general | 24 | premiums for private passenger automobile |
| 25 | expenses, the column labelled OW, which is | 25 | insurance in each province are report to |
|  | Page 98 |  | Page 100 |
| 1 | GISA 9502 is all general expenses. | 1 | GISA by each insurer. GISA complies this |
| 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 2 | information and presents it in an expense |
| 3 | Q. Right. And is that report you're referring | 3 | report that GISA prepares and releases for |
| 4 | to called the Industry Profit and Loss | 4 | each province". Is that the expense report |
| 5 | Report? | 5 | that you're referring to? |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | A. Under the column GISA is, yeah. | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | Q. Right. Okay. And so they've essentially | 9 | Q. And so that's the one that is, you named the |
| 10 | jumped from one GISA report with the | 10 | report and so on, but it's the Industry |
| 11 | expenses that they show attributed to Oliver | 11 | Expense report where you took the |
| 12 | Wyman, they're actually GISA, jumped to a | 12 | percentages right out of their presentation. |
| 13 | different report. | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | A. Correct. |
| 15 | A. Right, they have used the profit and expense | 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 16 | report which presents a subset of the | 16 | Q. So, you used a phrase a little earlier this |
| 17 | general expenses and didn't use the total | 17 | morning, "cherry picked". Would it be fair |
| 18 | general expenses which is available in the | 18 | to say that the authors of this report |
| 19 | report that we use that is specific to | 19 | "cherry picked" an expense from a different |
| 20 | private passenger expenses only. | 20 | GISA report material that is only a subset, |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 | as you say, of the total expenses? |
| 22 | Q. So, can you offer any explanation why the | 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 23 | authors would have left the expense report, | 23 | A. Well, the reference earlier was deciding to |
| 24 | the industry expense report that has the | 24 | exclude the high and the low. I'm going to |
| 25 | data right in it and gone off to a different | 25 | assume that the author misunderstood the |


|  | Page 101 | Page 103 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | data. I don't know why or what was provided | 1 |  | So, he has this expense report. He's |
| 2 | to Dr. Lazar, but perhaps did not have the | 2 |  | obviously pulled numbers out of it. I'm |
| 3 | complete information that would be required | 3 |  | sorry, I misspoke, I said expense report. |
| 4 | to present the expense information. | 4 |  | It's the Industry Profit and Loss Report. |
| 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 5 |  | LIOTT: |
| 6 | Q. Okay. Can I go back to the table 7 of the | 6 |  | Right. |
| 7 | Lazar report please? And the third item in | 7 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 8 | that table, Ms. Elliott, is claims ratio, do | 8 |  | That's where it comes from. |
| 9 | you see that? | 9 |  | LIOTT: |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 | A. | Yes. |
| 11 | A. Um-hm. | 11 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | Q. | My apologies, I misspoke. That's what he |
| 13 | Q. Which is simply net premium earned and I | 13 |  | has those numbers and that's where he got |
| 14 | guess, dividing net claims and adjusted by | 14 |  | those percentages that were incorrectly |
| 15 | net premium earned, is that right? | 15 |  | applied. |
| 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 16 |  | a.m.) |
| 17 | A. Correct. | 17 |  | LIOTT: |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | A. | Right, he picks up the ratio of the general |
| 19 | Q. So, there's ratios there for 2012 it's | 19 |  | expenses from this report, yes. |
| 20 | 79.13; 80.40; 94.22. I'm looking at some of | 20 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 21 | that industry and profit of loss report, are | 21 | Q. | Which you characterize as a subset of the |
| 22 | those percentages right out of that same | 22 |  | expenses. |
| 23 | report, do you know, can you tell that? | 23 |  | LIOTT: |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | A. | Of the total general expenses, yes, |
| 25 | A. I'm sorry, what was your question? | 25 |  | everything excluding commission and premium |
|  | Page 102 |  |  | Page 104 |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 |  | taxes we put in the bucket of general |
| 2 | Q. Okay. I'm looking at a page, page 25, it's | 2 |  | expenses. |
| 3 | not something that I have here that you | 3 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | have. I'm sure you have it, but not here | 4 | Q. | Right. Which is shown in the Industry |
| 5 | perhaps. It's the Industry Profit and Loss | 5 |  | expense report. |
| 6 | Report at page 25, it's the report you're | 6 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 7 | referring to. | 7 | A. | Correct. |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 9 | A. Yes, okay. | 9 | Q. | Thank you. |
| 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 10 |  |  |
| 11 | Q. And I'm looking at a line on that report | 11 | Q. | Mr. Stamp, might this be a good time to |
| 12 | that is described as "Net Claims and | 12 |  | break. |
| 13 | Adjustment Expenses" and it gives an amount | 13 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | and a ratio for each year. And the ratio it | 14 | Q. | Yes, that's fine, Chair. Thank you. |
| 15 | gives for 2012 is 79.1; for 2013 it's 80.4; | 15 |  | (BREAK - 11:01 a.m.) |
| 16 | for 2014 it's 94.2; for 2015 it's 92.1 ; and | 16 |  | (RESUME - 11:34 a.m.) |
| 17 | for 2016 it's 74.4. | 17 |  |  |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 |  | Back to you, Mr. Stamp. |
| 19 | A. Correct. | 19 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 | Q. | Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Elliott, I'm |
| 21 | Q. Those are the same numbers in Professor | 21 |  | going to ask if we can see the Lazar Report |
| 22 | Lazar's table 7. | 22 |  | at page 11, please. If I can catch the |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 |  | paragraph above the table. Yeah, that's it, |
| 24 | A. Correct. | 24 |  | that's fine there. So, Ms. Elliott, you see |
| 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 25 |  | there that the table, sorry, Table 5, and |




|  | Page 113 |  | Page 115 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | number 8 for the calendar year and some | 1 | CHAIR: |
| 2 | other number? | 2 | Q. Thank you, Mr. Stamp. Consumer Advocate? |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 4 | A. I don't know, they didn't elaborate on the | 4 | Q. Good morning, Paula, welcome back. |
| 5 | rationale for that. They've taken two | 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | numbers, averaged it and used that number. | 6 | A. Thank you. |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 8 | Q. Right, but I mean, is it appropriate to take | 8 | Q. Just a couple of questions. Looking at your |
| 9 | an average of loss ratio done by calendar | 9 | report and no particular page; you've |
| 10 | year, which has the weaknesses that you've | 10 | discussed two measures of profitability, |
| 11 | described and average it with a loss ratio | 11 | right? |
| 12 | done by the way you've described as being | 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 13 | the correct way and say that the halfway, | 13 | A. Yes. |
| 14 | the average is the right one to use? | 14 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | Q. The profitability as a percentage of premium |
| 16 | A. Yeah, it doesn't have a, like a precise | 16 | on a pre-tax basis, the POP method and I |
| 17 | meaning. So, if we looked at the chart that | 17 | guess what we easily say is the more |
| 18 | we were referencing on table 8 , each has a | 18 | commonly used standard after tax rate of |
| 19 | definite meaning. | 19 | return on equity, ROE, right? |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | Q. Yes. | 21 | A. Yeah. |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 23 | A. And then taking an average of the two is, I | 23 | Q. Mr. Feltham was asking you some questions |
| 24 | guess that's what it is, it's an average of | 24 | surrounding reserves. I'm just trying, and |
| 25 | the two. I don't have a definition for it | 25 | I don't want to be repetitive, so I'm just |
|  | Page 114 |  | Page 116 |
| 1 | other than that. Why would you do it? I | 1 | trying to get a better understanding I |
| 2 | don't know why it was done here, no. | 2 | either one of those methods how you factor |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 3 | in reserves? I just don't have-maybe you |
| 4 | Q. I'm asking you, I guess to think about what | 4 | could help me out here. |
| 5 | the merit is of that approach, an averaging | 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | of these two approaches. | 6 | A. Okay, sure. What we're trying to measure is |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | here, for a particular year, so these are |
| 8 | A. I don't know what the merit is of averaging | 8 | the premiums that were earned in that year. |
| 9 | of the two. | 9 | These are--and subtract from that the losses |
| 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 10 | that we estimate will be paid, ultimately be |
| 11 | Q. Do you see any merits? | 11 | paid for claims that occurred in that year. |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 | We subtract out the expenses that are |
| 13 | A. It's not what I would do. I don't see a | 13 | associated with that year, we take into |
| 14 | merit in--what we were presenting in our | 14 | consideration the investment income that |
| 15 | report was a consistent use of accident year | 15 | would have been earned that year on the cash |
| 16 | data with the full understanding of what an | 16 | flows that you have. |
| 17 | accident year means, without any influence | 17 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 18 | of reinsurance. That changes over time, of | 18 | Q. Yeah. |
| 19 | course. So, they've taken an apple or an | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | orange and if you will and average them | 20 | A. And the remainder is the profit and we |
| 21 | together. | 21 | measure it as a percentage of premium or as |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | a percentage of equity and pre-tax or after |
| 23 | Q. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Elliott, those are all | 23 | tax. So, in terms of the component of the |
| 24 | of my questions. | 24 | losses that we subtract out, we're |
| 25 | (11:45 a.m.) | 25 | subtracting out an estimate of what the |


|  | Page 117 |  | Page 119 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | losses will ultimately be paid for each of | 1 | sorry, and to be more specific, my point |
| 2 | those years, the claims that have occurred | 2 | being that most insurers, not all, but most |
| 3 | in that year. | 3 | have a number of lines of business. I mean, |
| 4 | So, on table 1, for accident year 2007, | 4 | some sell everything from home and auto, to |
| 5 | the bulk of the claims have been settled and | 5 | pet insurance, to medical health benefits, |
| 6 | closed. The estimates are of what's left to | 6 | things like that. But we're only looking |
| 7 | be paid, are pretty minimal, whereas for | 7 | here, in fairness to you at the auto line, |
| 8 | 2016, the estimate of what's left to be paid | 8 | correct? |
| 9 | would be much more substantive, it would be | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | the bulk of it. So, the companies report to | 10 | A. Correct, yeah. |
| 11 | GISA, and we're using GISA data, the amount | 11 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 12 | that's been paid for that accident year, the | 12 | Q. So, if we accept that next year every |
| 13 | case reserves that they estimate on each | 13 | insurer who sells auto in Newfoundland is |
| 14 | individual file and then on top of that we | 14 | going to lose money on that line of |
| 15 | add in a provision, which is referred to as | 15 | business; let's just say that for a moment, |
| 16 | a bulk reserve or an actual reserve and | 16 | okay. It doesn't mean that on the whole |
| 17 | that's our estimate, looking at hindsight | 17 | their business is not profitable, right? I |
| 18 | out claims have settled and closed over | 18 | mean, because they could be doing quite well |
| 19 | time. | 19 | on the other lines. |
| 20 | MR. WADDEN: | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | Q. Okay. | 21 | A. Right. Each province, for different |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | reasons, each line of business for different |
| 23 | A. But will ultimately be paid. | 23 | reasons could be worse or better. |
| 24 | MR. WADDEN: | 24 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 25 | Q. Right. So that's your way of accounting for | 25 | Q. Right, and you could almost say, I suppose |
|  | Page 118 |  | Page 120 |
| 1 | the fact that reserves are sort of moving | 1 | that in that case the auto line is looked at |
| 2 | targets, because they pop in, pop out, could | 2 | in the insurance industry sometimes as a |
| 3 | go up, could go down, depending on the | 3 | lost leader, much like, you know, milk in a |
| 4 | claim? | 4 | convenience store. |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | A. Right, and the coverage. | 6 | A. I don't believe that insurance companies |
| 7 | MR. WADDEN: | 7 | consider auto insurance as a lost leader, |
| 8 | Q. All right. This may be stating the obvious, | 8 | that's not my understanding, no. |
| 9 | but obviously this report and every report | 9 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 10 | you've done is based, in looking at auto | 10 | Q. Okay, right. Fair enough. |
| 11 | insurance and if we accept--in looking at | 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | this particular report, if the Consumer | 12 | A. And then it might, it's not my |
| 13 | Advocate accepts, I'm not 100 percent that | 13 | understanding. |
| 14 | we do, but if we do accept that | 14 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 15 | profitability for the insurers has not been | 15 | Q. They certainly don't want it to be a lost |
| 16 | great, is not looking good in terms of the | 16 | leader, I get that. But I suppose in a |
| 17 | automobile line of business? | 17 | given year, if they've not been profitable, |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | it could be looked at as a lost leader if |
| 19 | A. Right. Good years, bad years, more recently | 19 | that's the one line of business where |
| 20 | it's good. | 20 | they're not doing well? |
| 21 | MR. WADDEN: | 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 22 | Q. Right, okay. So, let's assume for the | 22 | A. Possibly, but - |
| 23 | moment that we accept that. It goes without | 23 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 24 | saying, I suppose, that this does not speak | 24 | Q. Yeah, okay. I just want to go briefly to, I |
| 25 | to their entire business as it were. I'm | 25 | think it's page 9 of this particular report. |


|  | Page 121 |  | Page 123 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | And just sort of a point of clarification | 1 | CHAIR: |
| 2 | for our own sake. In paragraph 2 there, it | 2 | Q. I guess we'll go back to you. We'll move to |
| 3 | says, "we assume there's an average delay in | 3 | the next report. |
| 4 | the receipt of premium of three months and | 4 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: |
| 5 | take this delay into consideration of our | 5 | Q. Thank you, Madam Chair. At this stage, I |
| 6 | calculations. We make no allowance for | 6 | understand Ms. Elliott is ready to make her |
| 7 | finance fee revenues collected by insurers." | 7 | presentation on the report entitled Other |
| 8 | And of course, there's a foot note. "If we | 8 | Coverages Review-Private Passenger |
| 9 | took into consideration finance fees | 9 | Automobile. |
| 10 | collected by insurers, this will increase | 10 | CHAIR: |
| 11 | our estimates of profit level". My only | 11 | Q. Whenever you're ready, Ms. Elliott. |
| 12 | question there is why not make that | 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 13 | allowance; why not consider those fees? | 13 | A. Okay. So, we were asked to review some |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | other elements, specific coverages for |
| 15 | A. Right. The reason for it is the reporting | 15 | private passenger automobile. A little |
| 16 | of the expense information. Many companies | 16 | lower down on this page are the four topics |
| 17 | net out the revenue that they receive for--I | 17 | that were considered and these four are: |
| 18 | think often it's a three percent of your | 18 | consideration of the \$200,000 minimum |
| 19 | premium is a charge for a monthly payment | 19 | mandatory third party liability limit, which |
| 20 | plan they refer to as finance fees. So, | 20 | is currently 200,000, and the implications |
| 21 | that amount is netted out from their general | 21 | of increasing that limit; to look at the |
| 22 | expenses that are reported. So, it's not | 22 | impact of offering direct compensation for |
| 23 | available to us who's netted it out or how | 23 | physical damage. Number three was to review |
| 24 | they've handled those finance fees. So, | 24 | the uninsured automobile coverage in |
| 25 | it's likely the majority has been netted | 25 | Newfoundland; and also to review the |
|  | Page 122 |  | Page 124 |
| 1 | out, so it is taken into account, but not in | 1 | relationship between Section B accident |
| 2 | all cases nor do we know who's done what | 2 | benefits and the settlement of claims with |
| 3 | with that. | 3 | regard to Section A benefits and whether |
| 4 | MR. WADDEN: | 4 | accident benefits should be mandatory. |
| 5 | Q. And is there a way to find out? | 5 | And going down a few pages into our |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 | report, on page five, looking at the most |
| 7 | A. Yes, and when companies submit rate | 7 | recent information that we had available at |
| 8 | application that is requested to identify | 8 | the time, which was 2016 data, a very small |
| 9 | their finance fees, revenues as a percentage | 9 | percentage vehicles are insured at the |
| 10 | of premium and that is taken into account | 10 | minimum \$200,000 limit. It was just a |
| 11 | specifically for each company in a rate | 11 | little over one percent. All private |
| 12 | application, but in terms of this aggregated | 12 | passenger vehicles are insured at the |
| 13 | data of industry expenses, it's buried | 13 | minimum limit and the majority of policy |
| 14 | within the general expense date for some | 14 | holders are at 500,000 or higher. |
| 15 | companies. | 15 | We did note that, with respect to the |
| 16 | MR. WADDEN: | 16 | Facility Association, which is often |
| 17 | Q. Okay. That's fine, Paula, thank you very | 17 | referred to as the insurer of last resort, |
| 18 | much. | 18 | it had 13 percent of its vehicles at the |
| 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 19 | minimum limit of 200,000 . So, a change to |
| 20 | A. Thank you. | 20 | increase the minimum limit from 200,000 to |
| 21 | CHAIR: | 21 | 500,000 would affect more of the Facility |
| 22 | Q. Thank you. Do we have any further | 22 | Association drivers and a pretty small |
| 23 | questions, Mr. O'Flaherty? | 23 | percentage, obviously one percent, of all |
| 24 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: | 24 | drivers in the province if it was to be |
| 25 | Q. No, questions. | 25 | increased. And the increase in third party |


|  | Page 125 |  | Page 127 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | liability limit from 200 to 500,000 is 11 | 1 | We didn't - we tried to assess the |
| 2 | percent for FA and insurers, it ranges from | 2 | relationship between accident benefit claim |
| 3 | an increase of 11 percent to 18 percent to | 3 | payments and bodily injury claim payments |
| 4 | go from 200 to 500,000 limit. | 4 | using the Closed Claim Study data, but |
| 5 | Our other finding was on -- the next | 5 | through the collection process, there wasn't |
| 6 | item was on direct compensation. So, direct | 6 | sufficient data available for that. |
| 7 | compensation right now, what is done in Nova | 7 | The other component that we were asked |
| 8 | Scotia and New Brunswick, it was introduced | 8 | to review was whether many policy holders |
| 9 | there, and third party liability currently | 9 | would be affected if the AB coverage was to |
| 10 | consists of the bodily injury component and | 10 | become mandatory. But currently, |
| 11 | the property damage component. | 11 | approximately 95 percent of the policy |
| 12 | So, with the introduction of DCPD that | 12 | holders do have accident benefit coverage. |
| 13 | takes the property damage component of TPL | 13 | It's an optional coverage in this province, |
| 14 | and splits that further into two parts known | 14 | but the majority - the vast majority buy the |
| 15 | as DCPD and PD-Tort. So, there's not a new | 15 | coverage. So, changing to a mandatory basis |
| 16 | coverage, if you will, introduced. It's | 16 | would not affect many policy holders, very |
| 17 | really just a splitting of a current | 17 | few, and the average premium currently is |
| 18 | coverage. And in the pricing, we'd have to | 18 | \$72. And that's sort of an overview of this |
| 19 | figure out how do we split that between the | 19 | report. |
| 20 | two components, because then they'll have a | 20 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: |
| 21 | separate premium for DCPD and PD-Tort. And | 21 | Q. Madam Chair, I understand from discussion |
| 22 | the rationale behind that is a more | 22 | with counsel that the ordinary order of |
| 23 | efficient way of claims handling. It's | 23 | questioning would now resume, which begins |
| 24 | reduction in the claims handling costs | 24 | with the Campaign. |
| 25 | because you won't have subrogation between | 25 | CHAIR: |
|  | Page 126 |  | Page 128 |
| 1 | insurers. It's a way to reduce claims | 1 | Q. Okay, thank you. To you, Mr. Feltham. |
| 2 | handling expenses. It doesn't add new costs | 2 | (12:00 noon) |
| 3 | to the system. | 3 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 4 | We do observe some changes with | 4 | Q. Thank you, Chair. I only just have a few |
| 5 | collision coverage, a change in the | 5 | questions, Ms. Elliott, on this report. The |
| 6 | frequency rate and severity, but in | 6 | first thing, page two of the report - well, |
| 7 | aggregate, the total cost for collision | 7 | it doesn't matter whether we look at it or |
| 8 | don't change, just the number of claims and | 8 | not, but you note four topics that are |
| 9 | the average cost of those claims, we've | 9 | discussed. |
| 10 | observed that in the other provinces. | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | The uninsured auto, this is a recovery | 11 | A. Um-hm. |
| 12 | of the - when there is a vehicle involved in | 12 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 13 | the accident for bodily injury or there's | 13 | Q. How were those four topics decided on? |
| 14 | death or property damage and that other | 14 | These are the four we're going to do versus |
| 15 | vehicle is either uninsured or unidentified. | 15 | not more or not less, whatever. |
| 16 | The number of claims in Newfoundland is much | 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 17 | higher than the other Atlantic Provinces. | 17 | A. I'd have to go back to the Terms of |
| 18 | When we look at our data, we don't know | 18 | Reference to refresh my memory on that. |
| 19 | specifically why a claim occurred, what | 19 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 20 | caused that claim or why it would be higher | 20 | Q. Sure, we can certainly do that. |
| 21 | in Newfoundland, the uninsured auto coverage | 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 22 | more claims in Newfoundland versus Nova | 22 | A. Sure. |
| 23 | Scotia and New Brunswick, but that is in | 23 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 24 | fact the case it is. Then we have a chart | 24 | Q. If we can have the Terms of Reference |
| 25 | within our report that outlines that. | 25 | brought up, please? |


|  | Page 129 |  | $\text { Page } 131$ <br> know, the premium being paid is tied to the |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | A. Phase II, the second bullet refers to the | 2 |  | optional coverages. If you buy those, |
| 3 | \$200,000 limit. The third bullet refers to | 3 |  | you're paying more premium. So, that |
| 4 | -- the last two bullets Section B and | 4 |  | contributes to a greater overall premium |
| 5 | whether coverage should be mandatory. And | 5 |  | being paid in the province for auto |
| 6 | then scroll down to the next page was the | 6 |  | insurance. |
| 7 | direct compensation and then Section D, the | 7 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 8 | uninsured auto. | 8 | A. | Yes, right. So, when people buy a coverage |
| 9 | MR. FELTHAM: | 9 |  | that they didn't have before, their total |
| 10 | Q. So, I guess, in terms of making the decision | 10 |  | premium would increase, yes. |
| 11 | as to which topics to report on, that was | 11 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 12 | your discretion? | 12 | Q. | And but there's been no examination by you |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 |  | of what's transpired in that regard over |
| 14 | A. We have an engagement letter and those were | 14 |  | time in this province? |
| 15 | the topics that we felt we could provide. | 15 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 16 | MR. FELTHAM: | 16 | A. | Well, in our report, the data is presented |
| 17 | Q. So, I guess, you know, one of the things | 17 |  | of the number of purchases, if you will, |
| 18 | that I expected when this report would come | 18 |  | vehicles with the coverage in the last five |
| 19 | out that I might see that I did not see was | 19 |  | years. That's provided, yes. |
| 20 | any analysis or examination of the, you | 20 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 21 | know, comprehensive collision coverages in | 21 | Q. | Okay. But not in a way that translates to |
| 22 | terms of the overall premium experience in | 22 |  | how that relates to what the premiums being |
| 23 | the province historically, how that may have | 23 |  | paid are? |
| 24 | contributed to any increase in premiums over | 24 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 25 | time, that subject area. | 25 | A. | We have the premium related to the |
|  | Page 130 |  |  | Page 132 |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 |  | coverages, yes. It's available. |
| 2 | A. I believe we've provided that. | 2 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 3 | MR. FELTHAM: | 3 |  | It's in the report? |
| 4 | Q. Where would I find that? | 4 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 | A. | It's in the report, yes. |
| 6 | A. Well, if I could have a moment? | 6 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 |  | In the profit report you say? |
| 8 | Q. Sure. | 8 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | A. | Yes, um-hm. |
| 10 | A. In the profit and rate adequacy report in | 10 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 11 | the appendix, we provide the coverage | 11 | Q. | Next question I have relates to the direct |
| 12 | information, collision, comprehensive, | 12 |  | compensation property damage. So, that's |
| 13 | specified perils, and we provide our | 13 |  | back to your Other Coverage Report at page |
| 14 | estimate of what the required premium would | 14 |  | two. And I want to take you to the last two |
| 15 | be and what the premium earned is for each | 15 |  | sentences of the second paragraph under that |
| 16 | accident. | 16 |  | heading, direct compensation property |
| 17 | MR. FELTHAM: | 17 |  | damage, and it says "there's no data to |
| 18 | Q. But is there any examination of these | 18 |  | measure the reduction in claims handling |
| 19 | optional physical damages coverage, because | 19 |  | costs with the introduction of DCPD in Nova |
| 20 | they are optional - | 20 |  | Scotia or New Brunswick. However, for |
| 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 21 |  | reasons that are not fully understood, in |
| 22 | A. Um-hm. | 22 |  | Nova Scotia there's been some evidence of an |
| 23 | MR. FELTHAM: | 23 |  | increase in the total DCPD and PD-Tort |
| 24 | Q. - in terms of whether people are purchasing | 24 |  | claims costs following the introduction of |
| 25 | more of those policies. Obviously, you | 25 |  | DCPD." |



|  | Page 137 |  | Page 139of policy holders, so the $\$ 25,000$ limit was |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | uninsured. What we presented are the actual | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | differences with the other provinces, but I | 2 |  | set in $19-\mathrm{I}$ don't know when it was set, |
| 3 | think the next step would be some sort of | 3 |  | but say 1980, presumably and thought that |
| 4 | policy of Government to address the issues | 4 |  | was sufficient at the time. With inflation, |
| 5 | that are causing or allowing drivers to | 5 |  | policy holders, claimants, would not be |
| 6 | drive without insurance. | 6 |  | getting the same level of coverage when they |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 |  | are involved in an accident and would have |
| 8 | Q. Thank you. And over to the next page, page | 8 |  | to call on AB coverage with the same limit |
| 9 | 11, in terms of accident benefits, and | 9 |  | today. So, for reasons that things increase |
| 10 | middle paragraph, you refer to, I guess, | 10 |  | over time that limits - you know, it's |
| 11 | what I'll call the Section B Closed Claims | 11 |  | prudent to review it and see if that's |
| 12 | Study. Is that fair? | 12 |  | appropriate. |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 14 | A. Um-hm. | 14 | Q. | And I'm not suggesting that, you know, it's |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 |  | our position that it shouldn't be \$50,000. |
| 16 | Q. It says for the 235 claimants that have | 16 |  | It's just, I guess, for most folks, based on |
| 17 | reported medical and rehabilitation costs, | 17 |  | these numbers, whether it's 25,000 or |
| 18 | the average medical and rehab costs were | 18 |  | \$50,000 or a million dollars, kind of |
| 19 | just a little over \$3,000 and for those, for | 19 |  | irrelevant. They're only accessing or able |
| 20 | the 234 claimants that had reported | 20 |  | to access, on average, \$3,058 in medical and |
| 21 | disability income costs, the average paid | 21 |  | 462 in disability income. |
| 22 | disability income costs were 462. | 22 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 23 | So, one of the changes that's being | 23 | A. | Right. And that's for a very small segment |
| 24 | proposed or advocated is - by at least some | 24 |  | where that information was provided. They |
| 25 | entities is an increase in Section B | 25 |  | certainly - that's not reflective of the |
|  | Page 138 |  |  | Page 140 |
| 1 | coverage limits from $\$ 25,000$ where they | 1 |  | actual costs for those sub-coverages. |
| 2 | presently stand to $\$ 50,000$, and that may be | 2 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 3 | quite valuable to someone who's able to | 3 | Q. | So, perhaps that's not very reliable in |
| 4 | access or needs to access a greater level of | 4 |  | terms of what it tells us? Is that what you |
| 5 | coverage beyond $\$ 25,000$ but it seems to me | 5 |  | mean? |
| 6 | that what these figures are telling us is | 6 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 7 | that most folks have not accessed or been | 7 | A. | It simply tells you for those claimants, |
| 8 | able to access beyond a few thousand dollars | 8 |  | this is what their average is. If you |
| 9 | or a few hundred dollars in each of these | 9 |  | wanted to look at what the average cost |
| 10 | benefit types. | 10 |  | today is for medical, for AB and for |
| 11 | So, I guess the question is: what value | 11 |  | disability income, that would be a different |
| 12 | do you see to the consumer in doubling the | 12 |  | number. |
| 13 | Section B limit in reality, given these | 13 |  | p.m.) |
| 14 | Closed Claim Study numbers? | 14 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 |  | Thank you very much. |
| 16 | A. Okay. Well, first of all, what we were | 16 |  |  |
| 17 | trying to provide here was a fulsome answer | 17 | Q. | Thank you, Mr. Feltham. |
| 18 | of what was collected and not intended to | 18 |  | ENS, Q.C.: |
| 19 | say that this would be statistically | 19 | Q. | No questions from APTLA in this regard. |
| 20 | accurate. It was just what was available | 20 |  | ZE, Q.C.: |
| 21 | and this was what was given and obviously 87 | 21 |  | No questions. |
| 22 | percent didn't report anything. So, pretty | 22 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | limited what we did have. In terms of - you | 23 |  | No questions. |
| 24 | know, it would be like, if you will, any | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | limit over time. It may not meet the needs | 25 | Q. | Consumer Advocate. |


|  | Page 141 |  | Page 143 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MR. WADDEN: | 1 | \$200,000 in public liability coverage, |
| 2 | Q. Just going back to the point Colin was | 2 | right? |
| 3 | making about uninsured vehicles, and you | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | know, these questions with respect to how to | 4 | A. Um-hm. |
| 5 | fix the problem of uninsured vehicles, the | 5 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 6 | numbers on the roads, are probably more | 6 | Q. Any idea of the number of those that would |
| 7 | properly put to the Registrar of Motor | 7 | be taxi cabs? |
| 8 | Vehicles and people like that to speak to it | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | more anecdotally. But that being said, | 9 | A. Oh, this is the private passenger - |
| 10 | given you've done work across the country, | 10 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 11 | do you have any anecdotal comments or | 11 | Q. Oh, sorry. In the Taxi Cab Report, does |
| 12 | evidence with respect to uninsured vehicles | 12 | that - I can't remember if that had a |
| 13 | on the road and what can or may be done to | 13 | particular number in it. We know pretty |
| 14 | reduce that issue, reduce that problem | 14 | much all of them were in Facility. |
| 15 | rather? | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | A. First of all, not knowing the exact reason | 17 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 18 | why it is higher in Newfoundland than other | 18 | Q. I'm just trying to figure out how many that |
| 19 | provinces, and if you can get to the bottom | 19 | is. Do you know? |
| 20 | of why it's higher in the province, that | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | will help solve. But hypothetically, if it | 21 | A. Not off the top of my head. I'd have to |
| 22 | is drivers that get insurance, they get | 22 | look again to see. |
| 23 | their pink slip and then they cancel their | 23 | MR. WADDEN: |
| 24 | policy for whatever reason, they are then | 24 | Q. Right. Sorry about that. No, that's fine. |
| 25 | driving with a slip that they can show. To | 25 | Thank you, Paula. |
|  | Page 142 |  | Page 144 |
| 1 | the extent that when a cancellation occurs | 1 | CHAIR: |
| 2 | that there's some other link mechanism to | 2 | Q. Thank you, Mr. Wadden. Any questions, Mr. |
| 3 | get the plates off that car, perhaps that's | 3 | O'Flaherty? |
| 4 | a solution. But I think there are better | 4 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: |
| 5 | people than myself that might dig into the | 5 | Q. No questions. And that concludes Ms. |
| 6 | reason and then find solutions with | 6 | Elliott's presentation, Madam Chair. |
| 7 | everybody involved working together. | 7 | CHAIR: |
| 8 | Because certainly having uninsured drivers | 8 | Q. Thank you, Ms. Elliott. |
| 9 | on the road is not good for anybody. But | 9 | MS. GLYNN: |
| 10 | I'm sure many people could come up with | 10 | Q. We will be back tomorrow morning, 9:00, with |
| 11 | ideas. | 11 | Dr. Misik. |
| 12 | MR. WADDEN: | 12 | CHAIR: |
| 13 | Q. Yeah, no, and fair enough. Like I said, | 13 | Q. Dr. Misik will be - |
| 14 | that's probably - I appreciate your comments | 14 | MS. GLYNN: |
| 15 | and that may be something more properly | 15 | Q. I think I'm saying his name - |
| 16 | answered by some of the Registrar of Motor | 16 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 17 | Vehicles who sees on the ground what the | 17 | Q. You are correct. |
| 18 | causal link is. | 18 | CHAIR: |
| 19 | I only had one other question. I don't | 19 | Q. Thank you so much. Thank you, Ms. Elliott. |
| 20 | think we need to go to the particular | 20 | UPON CONCLUSION AT 12:20 P.M. |
| 21 | paragraph, but you referenced in here in | 21 |  |
| 22 | terms of the number of vehicles in Facility, | 22 |  |
| 23 | I think it's in excess of 10,000 and | 23 |  |
| 24 | approximately 1400 of those vehicles, give | 24 |  |
| 25 | or take, are vehicles that have about | 25 |  |

## Page 145 <br> CERTIFICATE

I, Judy Moss, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript in the matter of the 2017 Automobile Insurance Review heard before the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, 120 Torbay Road, St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador and was transcribed by me to the best of my ability by means of a sound apparatus.

Dated at St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador this
6th day of September, 2018

Judy Moss
A

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